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Abstract 
This study analyzes the impact of rising health insurance costs and changing tax 
rates on wages and health insurance benefits. The study also investigates the underlying 
reasons for large metro-nonmetro and firm size gaps in wages and health insurance 
benefits. 
The cost of firm-provided health insurance net of inflation rose 104% from 1987 to 
2002. This trend should increase the likelihood that firms will reduce their contribution to 
health insurance benefits or drop them altogether. Over that same period, significant 
variation in the average marginal tax rate occurred in a number of states. Higher tax rates 
should raise the cost of compensation in the form of wages relative to benefits because 
benefits typically are untaxed. Consistent with these two hypotheses, empirical results show 
that both insurance costs and taxes have a significant impact on health insurance benefits 
and wages. The combined effects of the changes in health insurance costs and taxes was a 
4.6% reduction in the probability of firm-provided health insurance coverage, an 18.2% 
reduction in average employer contributions to health insurance, and a 17.9% increase in 
wages as employers shifted compensation from providing benefits to wages. 
Workers residing in nonmetro areas have less generous health insurance benefits 
and receive lower wages than workers residing in metro areas. Similarly, individuals working 
for smaller firms have less generous benefits and wages than individuals working for larger 
firms. Although health insurance costs and taxes have significant effects on benefits and 
wages, they explain little of the metro-nonmetro and firm size gaps. Consequently, 
equalizing health insurance premiums will have very little impact on the proportion of 
workers covered by employer-provided health insurance in small firms or in nonmetro areas. 
Differences in the education level of workers explain the largest portion of both the metro-
nonmetro and firm size compensation gaps. The higher incidence of nonmetro residents 
v 
employed by the smallest firms also explains a large portion of the metro-nonmetro gap. 
Other variables explaining the firm size gap include the lower incidence of workers 
employed full-time in small firms and local labor market conditions. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
Introduction 
In this study, we examine the factors influencing employer-provided health insurance 
benefits and wages. In particular, we look at the role of rising health insurance costs and 
changing marginal tax rates. We extend our analysis to examine metro-nonmetro and firm 
size differences in health insurance benefits and wages. Specifically, we explore how the 
metro-nonmetro and firm size gaps have evolved over time and investigate the underlying 
factors explaining the divide. 
In Chapter 1, we review the existing literature on employer-provided health insurance 
and wages. We begin by discussing the key trends affecting the level of health benefits in 
the U.S. We follow this discussion with an examination of the independent variables 
influencing health insurance provision, including taxes and health insurance costs. Our 
literature review ends with a review of research on both metro-nonmetro and firm size gaps 
in health insurance benefits. We conclude Chapter 1 with a simple theoretical model that 
illustrates how firms jointly choose hours, wages, and benefit levels so as to maximize 
profits. 
In Chapter 2, we discuss the independent and dependent variables in our study. 
These variables primarily come from the March Current Population Survey (CPS). A state-
specific time series for health insurance costs was created using data from a national health 
insurance company and the Source Book of Health Insurance Data (Health Insurance 
Association of America & Health Insurance Institute, various years). Chapter 2 concludes 
with a presentation of trends from 1987 to 2002. In particular, we discuss trends in health 
insurance costs, tax rates, employer-sponsored health insurance benefits, and wages. 
Trends are given for the sample as a whole, by region, and by firm size. 
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In Chapter 3, we use a probit model to determine the underlying factors of whether 
an individual is covered by employer-sponsored health insurance. We then apply an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model to identify the underlying factors of an employer's 
contribution to health insurance. We finish our general analysis with an OLS model that 
analyzes the employer's wage decision. In all three models, we pay particular attention to 
changes in health insurance costs and marginal tax rates. We then split the sample into 
metro and nonmetro regions and use these same models to investigate regional differences 
in health insurance coverage, health insurance quality, and wages. We use the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition to identify which variables are most important in explaining the 
metro-nonmetro differences in health insurance benefits and wages. This decomposition is 
also used to estimate how much of the observed differences can be explained by our model 
as a whole. 
In Chapter 4, we identify the underlying reasons for the difference in health insurance 
benefits and wages between different firm sizes. To accomplish this, we split the sample into 
five different firm sizes and utilize the three models discussed in Chapter 3. Again, we 
identify which variables explain the largest portion of the difference in health insurance 
provision between large and small firms. 
In Chapter 5, we discuss the main findings and implications from our study. We also 
suggest possible extensions to our research. 
Literature Review 
The dominant feature of the health insurance market in the U.S. has been the 
provision of private health insurance through the workplace. Table 1 reports the Employee 
Benefit Research Institution's (2003) calculations of health insurance coverage by source 
using data from the March CPS. EBRI showed that 64% of the non-elderly Americans 
obtained their insurance coverage through the workplace in 2002. The remaining non-
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elderly Americans were uninsured (17.3%), received public health insurance (15.9%) or 
purchased an individual policy (6.7%). EBRI attributed the increase in the uninsured 
between 1987 and 1993 to the erosion of employment-based health benefits. The decline in 
employer-provided health insurance overwhelmed the growth in insured due to public 
programs. By contrast, between 1993 and 1999, the dynamic reversed and the growth in 
employment-based coverage was overshadowed by a reduction in those covered by public 
programs. EBRI provided an explanation for the increase in the percentage of Americans 
with employment-based health benefits between 1997 and 2000, despite rapidly rising costs 
of health insurance. A strong economy and low unemployment rates caused more 
employers to provide health benefits in order to attract and retain workers, and also may 
have resulted in more workers being able to afford individual health coverage. 
Gubbins and Parmer (2001) identified four economic trends from 1988 to 1997 that 
changed the level of health benefits in the U.S. First, the authors discussed the increase of 
part-time jobs in the U.S. These part-time workers were less likely to receive health benefits 
than full-time workers. Second, Gubbins and Parmer examined corporate reengineering, 
which often involved business cost cutting measures such as reductions in employee benefit 
programs. Third, they reviewed the shift in employment from manufacturing to service 
industries. One consequence of these industry shifts was the decline in unions, which 
historically played a critical role in obtaining health insurance for their members. Finally, the 
authors highlighted the increased cost of health services, which translated into higher health 
insurance premiums for employers. 
A number of studies have documented increased health expenditures and health 
insurance premiums. As shown in Figure 1.2, health insurance premiums rose above both 
inflation and workers' earnings for most of 1988-2002 (Kaiser Family Foundation & Health 
Research Educational Trust, 2005). Their survey will understate the true increase in 
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insurance costs to the extent that employers have reduced the quality of their health 
insurance benefits over time. According to researchers at LIMRA International, national 
health expenditures more than doubled during the 1990's and have continued to increase in 
the 21st century (Hekeler, Witt, Potter, & Selby, 2003). Reasons provided for increased 
health expenditures included an aging U.S. workforce, consolidation of for-profit health care 
providers, labor shortages of certain health care workers, increased direct-to-consumer 
advertising of prescription drugs, escalating costs of malpractice insurance, and erosion in 
the value of fixed-dollar copayments. Increases in health expenditures led to double-digit 
premium rate hikes that proved challenging for both employers and employees. 
We found little empirical work on the effect of rising health insurance costs on health 
insurance provision and wages. This was probably because most researchers have used an 
employer's contribution to health insurance as the explanatory variable rather than actual 
health insurance costs. Kaestner and Simon (2002) concluded that state-level insurance 
reforms that raised insurance costs resulted in a decrease in the firm provision of health 
insurance benefits. A number of studies used the theory of compensating differentials to 
determine the effect on wages if changes were made to an employer's health insurance 
contribution (see Table 8 of Currie & Madrian, 1999, for a review of recent literature}.These 
studies looked at employer expenditures on health insurance, rather than an exogenous 
cost variable. Many studies failed to find that wages and health insurance benefits were 
inversely related, as one would expect from the theory (Currie & Madrian, 1999). 
Although health insurance costs have not been explored in depth, a strand of 
research concentrated on other independent variables affecting employer-sponsored health 
insurance. Using data from the CPS, Gubbins and Parmer (2001) showed that demographic 
composition and organizational characteristics alter the level of health benefits, and that 
these industry level effects have changed from 1988 to 1997. Farber and Levy (2000) found 
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that the health coverage rate increased monotonically with workers' education. EBRI (2002) 
reported that full-time workers, public sector employees, workers employed in 
manufacturing, professional workers, and individuals living in high-income families were 
most likely to have employment-based health benefits. Furthermore, workers in large firms 
were more likely to be covered than workers in small firms. Bundorf (2002) found that worker 
wages were positively correlated with the probability of offering health insurance. 
Furthermore, establishments with a greater proportion of workers in higher wage categories 
offered more generous plans. However, if firms choose the level of wages and benefits 
simultaneously, the positive correlation between high wages and high benefits does not 
imply a causal link. 
Correcting for the joint causality between wages and benefits makes the tradeoff 
between wages and benefits more apparent. Olson (2002) specifically researched the 
relationship between wages and health insurance. He used the husband's health insurance, 
union status, and firm size as instruments for their wives' probability of receiving employer-
sponsored health insurance. His estimates suggested that wives with their own employer 
health insurance accepted a wage around 20 percent lower than what they would have 
received working in a job without health insurance. Alternatively, women married to men with 
health insurance through their jobs earned 1.6%-2.6% more per hour. Olsen hypothesized 
that spousal health insurance allowed these women to accept a higher-paying job because 
they did not need health insurance through their own employer. 
Employer contributions to health insurance can be deducted as a business expense, 
and they are not counted for the employer's share of employment taxes. This preferential 
tax treatment is highly controversial due to its potential economic distortion and effect on 
government revenues. The current tax policy of excluding employer-provided health 
insurance from a firm's payroll base provides incentives for higher levels of insurance than 
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individuals might otherwise choose, leading to proposals that the tax exclusion for health 
insurance be eliminated or capped (Royalty, 2000). Furthermore, preferential tax treatment 
of health insurance has a large impact on the fiscal budget. For the fiscal year 2005, health 
insurance accounts for 15.6% of total tax expenditures in the budget. The FY 2005 budget 
reports that the tax exemption for employment-based health insurance is projected to cost 
the federal government$ 653.7 billion from 2005 through 2009 (EBRI, 2004). 
Many papers have estimated the effect of taxes on the provision or quality of health 
insurance. Virtually all studies have concluded that taxes were an important factor in the 
provision of health insurance, although there is a wide range in the magnitude of estimates 
(Currie & Madrian, 1999). Using data from the Employment Cost Index, Gruber and Lettau 
(2004) found the elasticity of a firm offering health insurance with respect to the tax price of 
insurance for the median worker to be -0.25. Furthermore, the elasticity of firm spending 
conditional on offering health insurance was -0.7. Their simulations suggested that major tax 
reform could lead to a large reduction in employer-provided health insurance spending. 
Royalty (2000) also concluded that tax rates do exert a significant positive effect on 
employer offerings of health insurance. The effect of a one point increase in taxes on the 
probability of health provision by the employer ranged from 0.8 to 1.0 point, depending on 
the model specified. Thomasson (2003) used a micro-level dataset from the 1950's to 
examine how the 1954 codification of the tax subsidy affected the quantity demanded of 
health insurance. After the tax subsidy, she found that households with higher marginal tax 
rates were both more likely to purchase health insurance coverage and to purchase more 
coverage than lower marginal tax rate households. She estimated an elasticity of the 
amount of health insurance coverage purchased with respect to the after-tax price of 
insurance of -0.54, and cautioned that the health care system has changed dramatically 
since 1954. Turner (1987) took an alternate view, and argued that the tax effect was 
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economically insignificant. Although he found that taxes had a statistically significant effect, 
he claimed that less than five percent of the growth of the fringe share from 1954 to 1979 
could be attributed to changes in marginal federal, state and social security tax rates. In 
particular, he found the elasticity of the health insurance share of employee compensation 
with respect to the marginal federal tax rate was 0.21. 
One in five Americans lives in rural America. Compared to residents who live in 
urban communities, rural residents are generally poorer, older, and less healthy (Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured & The Edmund S. Muskie School of Public 
Service, 2003). Rural concerns have become central to health policy, yet few studies 
examine the wide gap in health insurance coverage and quality between rural and urban 
areas. 
The Kaiser Commission and The Muskie School (2003) used the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to identify the causes of health insurance disparities 
faced by rural residents. They found that there were wide gaps in health insurance coverage 
between rural residents who lived in counties adjacent versus not adjacent to an urban 
county. As shown in Figure 1.3, both types of rural workers were less likely to work for an 
employer who offered them health insurance. Residents of rural, non-adjacent counties had 
the lowest rate of employer-provided health insurance coverage. When health benefits were 
offered, enrollment rates were similar between rural and urban workers. 
The Kaiser Commission and The Muskie School (2003) found at least 40% of all 
rural workers were employed by small businesses with fewer than 20 employees. They also 
showed that health benefits were less likely to be offered in these smaller firms, especially in 
rural areas. Only 35% of workers in rural, non-adjacent areas who worked for a small 
business had an employer who offered them health benefits. This compared to 47% of 
urban workers in small businesses. Furthermore, they showed that over two-thirds of 
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uninsured workers who lived in rural, non-adjacent counties were working for firms with less 
than 20 employees. 
Variyam and Kraybill (1998) examined the relationship between employer size and 
the provision of health insurance in a sample of rural businesses. This sample of businesses 
was drawn from a relatively small region in Georgia, so their conclusions may not be 
applicable to all rural areas. As firm size increased by ten employees, they found the 
probability of health insurance provision increased by 3.2%. They also concluded that the 
educational level of owners/managers and the skill levels of workers were positively related 
to the employer provision of health insurance. 
Jensen (1982) analyzed the nonwage compensation practices of metro and 
nonmetro establishments using the 197 4 Employer Expenditures for Employee 
Compensation Survey (EEEC). The dependent variable was the amount of employer 
expenditures for combined life, accident, and health insurance per employee. She reported 
data separately by metro status for office workers and non-office workers. Establishment 
size, manufacturing industry, unionization, and wage levels all had a positive effect on the 
level of employer-provided insurance in both markets. However, the marginal effects of 
these factors differed, evidence of different compensation strategies for nonmetro and metro 
firms. For example, there were large differences in compensation levels in specific industries 
such as mining and construction. 
Jensen (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1983) found that farmers and farm families 
were less likely to have health insurance coverage than nonfarm families. According to the 
1976 Survey of Income and Education (SIE), 86% of families with farm income had health 
insurance coverage in 1976, compared with over 90% of the total population. Furthermore, 
only 82% of farmers and farm managers had coverage. In contrast to the overall population, 
the majority of insured farmers and farm managers had individual health insurance 
9 
coverage. Only around 23% of insured farmers and farm managers had firm-provided health 
insurance coverage. Jensen found that age, family status, region, employment status, 
occupation, and income all had a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of health 
insurance coverage. 
Small businesses are an important component of the U.S. economy and the labor 
market. The Small Business Administration (2004) defines a small business as a company 
with fewer than 500 employees. As shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, small businesses 
represent over 99 percent of employer firms and employ around half of all private sector 
employees (SBA, 2005). 
The quality of jobs in small businesses has concerned both economists and 
policymakers. The employer size-wage effect has been well documented in a number of 
studies (see Troske, 1999, for a review of seven possible explanations). Brown, Hamilton, 
and Medoff (1990) reported that workers in companies with 500 or more employees earned 
35% higher wages than workers in companies with fewer than 500 employees. This made 
the employer size-wage premium as large as the gender-wage gap and larger than the 
wage differential associated with race and union status. Troske (1999) found the matching 
of more-skilled workers together in larger plants accounted for approximately 18% of the firm 
size-wage premium, while capital-skill complementarity accounted for approximately 45% of 
the firm size-wage premium. Oi and ldson (1999) showed that the wage-size premium 
decreased to 27.8% when education, job tenure, and other worker traits were included in the 
wage equation. In both Troske and Oi and ldson's studies, there still remained a large, 
significant, and unexplained employer size-wage premium. 
Employee benefit provision and quality has also been documented as lower in 
smaller firms (EBRI, 2003; Hekeler et al., 2003; Kaiser, 2005). Bundorf (2002) reported that 
larger establishments were more likely to offer health insurance, offer more generous plans, 
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and offer a choice among plans. Gubbins and Parmer (2001) found a negative relationship 
between the level of health benefits received and the proportion of employees in small firms 
in an industry. The size of this effect grew between 1988 and 1997. We found few studies 
that examined the underlying reasons for this gap in employee benefits between small and 
large firms. Leibowitz and Chernew (1992) concluded that the primary reason small firms do 
not offer health insurance as often as large firms is the prohibitively high premium cost. 
As shown in Figure 1.4, health insurance premium increases accelerated for all sizes 
of firms from 1996 to 2002 (Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research Educational Trust, 
2005). Again, the Kaiser survey will understate the true increase in insurance costs. Small 
firms experienced larger premium increases than large firms in all of these years. Higher 
rates of premium inflation for small firms reflect their inferior bargaining position with insurers 
and heavy reliance on fully insured plans. The firm-size gap widened from 1996 to 2001, 
and then decreased significantly in 2002. In 1996, firms with 3 to 199 employees 
experienced a 2.1 % premium increase compared to 0.3% for firms with 5,000 or more 
employees. In 2002, firms with 3 to 199 employees experienced a 13.5% premium increase 
compared to 12.7% for firms with 5,000 or more employees. One of our goals is to 
determine if differences in health insurance costs by firm over time explains the firm size-
benefit gap. 
Employers made many changes to their health insurance plans to manage price 
increases (Hekeler et al., 2003). This included the share of the premium they covered, the 
types of coverage allowed, and the employees' out-of-pocket expenses. As shown in Table 
1.4, small employers were less likely than large employers to pass along premium increases 
to employees. Only 49% of firms with 1 Oto 19 employees passed along premium increases 
to employees, compared with 85% in firms with at least 5,000 employees. According to 
Hekeler et al. (2003), this may be due to the fact that fewer small employers offered health 
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insurance. When they did offer benefits, their motivations may have been more deliberate. 
For example, small employers were more apt to operate family businesses or have only a 
few key employees for whom they provided medical benefits. As shown in Table 1.5, 
employers also reduced the quality of their health insurance plans to manage costs. Again, 
smaller employers were less likely to do so than large employers. Increasing co-payments 
for doctor visits and other services was the most common cost management activity. 
Twenty-five percent of firms with 1 O to 19 employees increased co-payments, compared 
with 41 % in firms with at least 5,000 employees. 
This study examines several areas that have not been explored in depth in the 
existing literature. First, we use a previously unavailable price series to analyze the impact 
of rising health insurance costs on health insurance coverage, health insurance quality, and 
wages. Second, we investigate the underlying reasons for the wage and health insurance 
gaps between metro and nonmetro areas. Finally, we examine the underlying reasons for 
the differences in wage and health insurance benefits between different firm sizes. For both 
the regional and firm size analysis, we evaluate how these differences have changed over 
time. 
Theoretical Model 
In this section we present a simple theoretical model that illustrates how firms jointly 
choose hours, wages, and benefit levels so as to maximize profits. We extend the model of 
Cutler and Madrian (1998) to the case where wages and benefits are endogenous. 
We are primarily interested in illustrating why firms may make different choices 
regarding the mix of wages and benefits to offer their employees. Firms offer employment 
contracts that specify wage and benefit levels so as to maximize profits, given the cost of 
offering each of these two elements of the contract. 1 The relative cost of benefits changes 
over time as a result of changes in the tax rate and the cost of health insurance. Firms are 
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assumed to have some control over the wages and benefits they offer, but the cost of the 
benefit and the tax rate is exogenous. 2 
A primary reason firms provide health insurance to their employees is because they 
can obtain more favorable terms in acquiring health insurance than can their employees 
[Currie & Madrian, 1999; Gruber, 2000). Thus, by offering the benefit rather than a similar 
dollar amount of wages, the firm may be able to raise worker utility without adding 
compensation cost.3 There are two main reasons why employers can access health 
insurance at a lower cost than can individual workers. First, employers can reduce adverse 
selection and lower administrative expenses by bundling many health insurance policies into 
one. Insurance companies are willing to cut the price of a pooled policy because of the lower 
cost of providing multiple clients the same menu of services. Firm costs of purchasing health 
insurance are also lower because of the favorable tax treatment given to benefits versus 
wages. A worker who buys an insurance policy must pay with after-tax earnings. Thus, if a 
worker earns $W in wages which he uses to purchase health insurance, he will only have 
$W(1-t) left to purchase the insurance policy, where t < 1 is the marginal income tax rate. 
Alternatively, if the firm pays the same amount in compensation but in the form of a health 
insurance benefit, the worker receives $W of the insurance benefit. 
For the firm to attract workers, it must offer a compensation package that at least 
meets a worker's opportunity wage at other firms, U(Z). Z is an index of skill such that 
U z > 0. The firm's wage, W, health insurance benefit, B, and work hours, h, must satisfy 
U(Z) ~ U(W(l- t), B, h,) where Uw > 0, U 8 > 0,and Uh < 0, and where tis the tax rate. 
This implies that for workers of a given skill level Z, and other attributes X, a firm will 
face a supply schedule of hours that their employers are willing to work. The supply 
schedule is given by 
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(1.1) h=h((l-t)W,B;Z,X) 
where hw > 0, hww < 0, and h88 < 0. Equation (1) implies that the firm can induce more 
hours from its workers of a given skill level by raising the after-tax wage rate, (1-t)W, or by 
raising health insurance benefits, B. However, it becomes more expensive to increase hours 
of work by raising compensation as the levels of W and B increase. 
Given (1.1 ), the firm is assumed to choose an employment and compensation mix 
that maximizes profit. The firm's profit maximization problem, treating the output price as 
numeraire, can be written 
(1.2) max;r = f (Nh)- N(Wh + C 8 B) 
N,W,B 
where C 8 is the cost of obtaining a health insurance policy for an employee and N is the 
number of workers. 
The firm chooses N directly but sets h implicitly by its choices of W and B. The firm's 
short-run production function, f(•), depends on the total hours of labor employed. The 
production function is assumed to be concave in the labor input. 
Inserting (1.1) into (1.2) and taking the first order conditions, we obtain 
(1 3A) d;r = hf'-(wh + C 8 B) = 0 . dN 
(1.3B) ~~= NF'(l-t)hw -Nh-NW(l- t)hw =0 
(1.3C) ~~ = Nf'h 8 -NC 8 - NWh 8 = 0 
We can calculate the reduced form by solving equations 1.3A-1.3C simultaneously. 
This allows us to write the endogenous variables as a function of the exogenous variables. 
We then arrive at the following three equations: 
(1.4A) N = N(t,CB ,Z,X) 
(1.4B) W = W(t,CB ,Z,X) 
(1.4C) B = B(t,CB ,Z,X) 
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Since our primary interest is wages and benefits, we focus on equations 1.48 and 
1.4C. Specifically, our endogenous variables are the probability of being covered by firm 
provided health insurance, the quality of health insurance, and hourly wages. We will use 
probit estimation for health insurance coverage, and ordinary least squares regression for 
the quality of health insurance and hourly wages. The empirical strategy will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3. 
The exogenous variables central to our study are health insurance costs and tax 
rates. We expect that health insurance costs will have a negative effect on the probability 
that an employer provides benefits and on the employer's contribution to benefits if they do 
offer health insurance. Higher insurance costs should raise the wage offer because the 
relative cost of wages will be cheaper to the firm. Higher tax rates raise the cost of 
compensation in the form of wages relative to benefits because benefits typically are 
untaxed. 
In Figure 1.1, we illustrate the nature of the wage and benefit contract two types of 
firms offer to their workers. We assume that these firms are perfectly competitive so that 
they earn zero economic profit. The firms hire from a homogeneous labor pool and so they 
have to offer a competitive utility level 0 in order to attract and retain workers. 
To show how the relative cost of compensation affects the firms' wage and benefit 
offers, suppose that Firm 1 faces a lower cost of benefit provision and a higher cost of 
offering wages. Specifically, assume that C18 < c: and that t 1 > t 2 • Since benefits are 
relatively less costly in Firm 1 than Firm 2, Firm 1 provides higher benefits. At the same 
time, wages are more costly for Firm 1 to provide, and so they offer lower wages than Firm 
15 
2. Firm 1 's optimal contract is given by point A and Firm 2's contract by point B. Despite 
offering different contracts, both are on the same indifference curve, and so the firms' 
contracts provide the same level of utility to workers. 
We found that otherwise equivalent firms faced different marginal tax rates and 
health insurance costs. For example, the cost of insurance for employees in the smallest 
firms was modestly more expensive than for employees in the largest firms. According to 
Currie and Madrian (1999), this was because the average administrative costs of health 
insurance provision were lower in big firms. Furthermore, the marginal tax rate for small 
firms was slightly lower than for large firms. Following the contract presented in Figure 1.1, 
large firms will offer more benefits to their employees than small firms. The employer's 
contribution to health insurance divided by wages was 5.6% for employees in the largest 
firms and 3.7% for employees in the smallest firms. 
We found the cost of insurance for employees living in nonmetro areas was less 
expensive than for employees living in metro areas. Furthermore, the marginal tax rate for 
nonmetro residents was slightly higher than for metro residents. However, the employer's 
contribution to health insurance divided by wages was 4.9% for employees living in 
non metro areas and 5.1 % for employees living in metro areas. Our analysis suggests that 
the regional difference in the contribution/wage ratio was largely due to firm sizes. For 
employees residing in nonmetro areas, this ratio was 2.9% if they worked in the smallest 
firms and 5.7% if they worked in the largest firms. For employees residing in metro areas, 
this ratio was 3.8% if they worked in the smallest firms and 5.6% if they worked in the largest 
firms. These ratios suggest the regional difference was largely due to firm size. 
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T bl a e 1.2: Sh are o f F b F E irms 1y 1rm mpoyment s· 1ze 
1988 1993 1998 2002 
<20 employees 89.7% 89.8% 89.4% 89.3% 
20-99 employees 8.7% 8.6% 8.9% 8.9% 
100-499 
employees 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 
500+ employees 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: From U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, based on data provided by the 
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. Business and Nonemployer Statistics. 
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T bl 1 3 Sh a e .. are o f E b F E mp oyees 1y rrm mpoyment s· rze 
1988 1993 1998 2002 
<20 employees 20.9% 20.1% 18.8% 18.3% 
20-99 employees 19.2% 18.4% 17.9% 17.7% 
100-499 
employees 14.5% 14.6% 14.3% 14.2% 
500+ employees 45.5% 46.9% 49.1% 49.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: From U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, based on data provided by the 
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. Business and Nonemployer Statistics. 
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T bl 1 4 M a e anagement o f Md' IP e 1ca rem1um R ate ncreases, b s· lY 1ze o f E mp oyer 
Total 10-19 20-99 100- 500- 1000- 5000+ 
499 999 4,999 
Absorb entire increase 43% 51% 39% 20% 20% 12% 15% 
Passed all onto employees 7 5 9 13 7 2 3 
Passed some onto 50 44 53 67 73 87 82 
employees 
Note: From "The Changing Group Insurance and Health Care Marketplace: The Medical Marketplace 
2003,"by R. Hekeler, J. Witt, A. Potter, and M. Selby, 2003, LIMRA International. Copyright 2003 by 
LIMRA International. Reprinted with permission. 
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T bl 1 0 h C M a e .5: t er ost anagement A ... ct1v1t1es, b s· )y 1ze o f E mpo1 'er 
Total 10-19 20-99 100- 500- 1000- 5000+ 
499 999 4,999 
Increase copayments for 
doctor visits and other services 28% 25% 28% 36% 38% 42% 41% 
Increase employee deductibles 26 26 24 44 39 43 41 
Switch to a lower cost plan 
with the same carrier 21 21 20 25 14 15 13 
Switch to a lower cost plan 
with a different carrier 10 6 11 20 11 9 13 
Introduce tiered pricing for 
hospital procedures 6 12 1 6 1 4 5 
SomethinQ else 5 3 6 10 21 19 26 
Note: From "The Changing Group Insurance and Health Care Marketplace: The Medical Marketplace 
2003," by R. Hekeler, J. Witt, A. Potter, and M. Selby, 2003, LIMRA International. Copyright 2003 by 
LIMRA International. Reprinted with permission. 
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Figure 1.1: Wage/benefit contract 
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Chapter 2: Data 
Discussion of Data 
The majority of the data came from the 1988-2003 editions of the March CPS 
(Unicon, 2004). The March CPS is the primary source of labor force characteristics of the 
U.S. civilian population. It is also the official source of data on unemployment rates, poverty, 
and income in the U.S. All CPS questions on wages and health insurance refer to the 
previous year. For example, in March of 2003, interviewers asked about health insurance 
coverage during 2002. 
The focus of our study was on employer-provided health insurance, so we made a 
number of restrictions. Because the CPS only includes information on compensation for the 
previous year, we excluded individuals who did not work at all the previous year. We also 
did not include those individuals serving in the armed forces, those who were self-employed, 
or those classified as students, retired, or disabled. Finally, due to a lack of data on their 
health insurance costs, we excluded individuals from the state of Hawaii. 
Our sample included only single workers age 25 to 60. This age range covered an 
individual's prime working years. We excluded married couples to avoid complications 
caused by one spouse's compensation package affecting the other spouse's acceptance of 
health insurance coverage. Farber and Levy (2000) found that half the decline in benefit 
take-up was attributable to spousal benefits, and concentrating on single workers provided 
us a one-to-one correspondence between the wage and health benefits offered by the firm 
and the decisions made by the worker. Our final sample consisted of 249,821 individuals 
spread over the studied period of 1987 to 2002. 
As shown in Table 2.1, the sample distributions of single workers approximated the 
range of health insurance benefits received by the labor force as a whole. For example, the 
estimates for all workers of employer-sponsored health insurance coverage for 1987, 1995, 
26 
and 2002 were 63%, 59% and 61 % respectively. This corresponds to estimates for single 
workers of 65%, 62% and 64%. Overall, single workers were slightly more likely to be 
covered by firm-provided health insurance, from 1.5% more likely in 1993 to as high as 4.2% 
in 1999. We include selected sample statistics and regression results for all workers in the 
Appendix. While the coefficient signs are similar between single workers and all workers, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients differ. However, changes in the sample will not alter the 
conclusions dramatically. 
We provide summary information on the variables of our study and their empirical 
definitions in Tables 2.2-2.4. Due to the sensitive nature of the insurance cost data, means 
are not reported for specific regions or firm sizes. For the dependent variables in our wage 
and benefit equations we used 1) health insurance coverage through an employer, 2) the 
quality of health insurance, 3) and hourly wages. We obtained all three dependent variables 
from the CPS. 
First, we measured health insurance coverage through an employer using a dummy 
variable to indicate whether or not the employer contributed to health insurance. The March 
CPS asked about health insurance coverage in the previous calendar year. According to the 
U.S. Census Bureau (2005), health insurance was likely to be underreported on the March 
CPS. One reason for this may be the fact that the March CPS collected health insurance 
information by asking in February through April about the previous year's coverage. Some 
people may have reported their insurance coverage status at the time of their interview 
rather than their coverage status during the previous calendar year. Berger, Black, and Scott 
(1998) found that individuals who were in both the March CPS and April/May CPS often 
gave inconsistent responses on their health insurance status, perhaps due to the differences 
in the wording of the health insurance questions. They recommended changing the wording 
of the March survey to make it similar to the April/May survey. Starting in 1995, the March 
27 
CPS questions around employer-provided health insurance coverage were more similar to 
the April/May questions. Berger et al. (1998) found that the differences in the firm and 
worker reports of coverage were uncorrelated with standard worker and firm characteristics, 
suggesting classical measurement error that does not bias the parameters of models 
explaining health coverage. 
Second, we estimated the quality of health insurance using a continuous measure of 
the dollar amount the employer contributed to health insurance. Our measure of the 
employer contribution was based on Census Bureau simulations using data from the 1977 
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey. Therefore, the employer's contribution is best 
thought of as the expected rather than as the actual employer contribution. Series P60-
186RD, Measuring the Effect of Benefits and Taxes on Income and Poverty (U.S. 
Department of Commerce and Bureau of the Census, 1992) discusses these simulations in 
detail. Finally, we measured wages by multiplying weeks worked by average weekly 
earnings, and dividing the result by the annual hours worked for wages. 
For the independent variables in our wage and benefit equations, we utilized 1) 
metropolitan status, 2) worker status, 3) cost of health insurance, 4) marginal tax rates, 5) 
employer size, 6) local labor market conditions, 7) measures of skill, 8) living costs, and 9) 
personal characteristics. 
First, we measured metropolitan status with a dummy variable that came from the 
Master Segment Tape in the CPS, which supplied all geographic identifiers for the CPS 
data. The CPS identified whether or not an individual resided in a metro area, but did not 
specify the location of their employment. As a result, it is possible we understated the 
differences in metro and nonmetro compensation, as some nonmetro workers may have 
commuted to metro areas for their job and vice-versa. Additionally, the CPS changes its 
definition of metro status as populations change, so the same area might change from 
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nonmetro to metro and vice versa. Next, we measured worker status with a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the individual was a full-time worker at any time during the 
previous year. 
Then, we used data for 2000-2003 provided by a national insurance company to 
compute cross-sectional health insurance costs. These health insurance costs varied by 
state, by areas within each state, as well as by employer size. Using the Source Book of 
Health Insurance Data (Health Insurance Association of America and Health Insurance 
Institute, various years), we created state-specific time series back to 1988. The Source 
Book provided us by state with the average daily cost per patient in community hospitals for 
the years 1987-2000. The hospital costs reflected total inpatient and outpatient costs per 
inpatient equivalents. 
There are a number of advantages to using the hospital bed data. First, it is the only 
known publicly available data source for medical costs with state variation. Second, it is 
highly correlated with the national consumer price index on medical care. Third, insurance 
companies base rate changes in part on the change in costs of hospitalization. According to 
McKinsey & Company (2002), inpatient and outpatient facilities represented around 38% of 
health care costs from 1995-2001. Finally, the hospital bed data allows us to hold constant 
the quality of the health insurance policy as we go back in time. The main disadvantage to 
using the hospital bed data is it doesn't represent other medical costs, such as physician 
services. Additionally, it may reflect changes due to changes in demographics that are 
unrelated to the actual cost of insurance, such as the elderly moving into the state of 
Florida. 
Our price series was unique because it remained unclouded by changes in the 
quality of benefits offered by firms. This is because the cross sectional relationship is based 
on a specific health insurance policy that does not vary across time. In contrast, estimates 
29 
based on average employer contributions to health insurance understated the true change 
in insurance prices because firms reduced the quality of the benefits offered over time. 
To show how we generated the price series, let Ci~ be the cost of insuring an 
individual worker i if he were given the health insurance package provided by this national 
insurance company in the year 2000. The insurance cost is based on the individual's state, 
metropolitan area, and firm size. To create a year t cost of providing that same insurance 
package, the price series for hospitalization is applied. Let Bi~ be the average cost of 
hospital beds in individual i's state in 2000 and let n;,1 be the average cost of hospital beds 
in the same state in year t. Then the estimated cost of the 2000 health insurance package 
for individual i in year t is: 
C;,r =Ci~* (B!,1 I Bi~) 
We calculated the individual's income tax rate as the average sum of both the state 
and federal marginal tax rates in the state. Unicon Research Corporation included projected 
tax information in their CPS data release. The tax rates were Census Bureau simulations 
based on data from the CPS and statistical summaries of individual income tax returns 
compiled by the Internal Revenue Service. The tax rates were primarily generated from 
income and demographic information. Therefore, the tax rate should be seen as an 
expected, not an actual, tax rate. 
The Census Bureau federal income tax simulation required up to four separate 
operations: 1) an estimate of the tax filing unit based on household relationship, marital 
status, and dependency rules; 2) an estimate of adjusted gross household income based on 
the defined tax filing unit; 3) an estimate of federal income tax from the household income 
and filing status; 4) if applicable, an estimate of earned income tax credits. A model of each 
state's income tax regulations allowed the Census Bureau to project state income tax, also, 
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and Series P60-186RD, Measuring the Effect of Benefits and Taxes on Income and Poverty 
(U.S. Department of Commerce and Bureau of the Census, 1992) discusses these tax 
projections in detail. 
The CPS reported employer size with five separate dummy variables. The smallest 
employers had fewer than 25 employees who comprised 23.3% of the workers in the data 
set. The largest employers had more than 1,000 employees with 39.2% of workers in the 
data set. The middle-sized employers incorporated the remaining 37.5% of the workers. 
We used the unemployment rate, the average non-supervisory manufacturing wage, 
and the sum of union membership and union coverage to describe local labor market 
conditions. Tight labor market conditions, resulting from a strong economy, should have a 
positive effect on employee compensation. We utilized the log of the state average non-
supervisory manufacturing wage for an indicator of local wage competition. It was important 
for us to include union membership/coverage because numerous studies have shown that 
unionized workers receive higher wages and benefits than do non-unionized workers 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
The remainder of our independent variables included measures of skill, living costs, 
and personal characteristics. The measures of skill contained linear and quadratic terms in 
experience and education. Changes in the consumer price index controlled for changes in 
the cost of living over time, and measures of the land prices in the state controlled for cross-
sectional variation in living costs. The dummy variables used to identify personal 
characteristics were gender, race, marital status, and the number of children under the age 
of 18. Specifically, the CPS reported marital status with three separate dummy variables: 1) 
never married, 2) divorced, and 3) widowed. 
The March CPS included a March supplement weight. This weight is the measure of 
the number of actual persons that each observation in the sample represents. The Census 
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Bureau uses weights to correct for nonresponse and for subpopulations that are 
oversampled to allow more precision in reported statistics for minority groups. These 
weights divided by 100 were applied using the frequency weight command in Stata for all 
summary statistics and regressions to derive population means and regression coefficients. 
Trends Over Time 
Firm-provided health insurance costs rose rapidly over the years we studied. As 
shown in Figure 2.1, after correcting for inflation, average costs rose 104% from 1987 to 
2002. The largest premium increases occurred between 1993 and 1994, and 2000 to 2002. 
The average income tax rate for all individuals in the sample remained relatively 
stable over the sample period. However, as shown in Figure 2.2, significant variation 
occurred in a number of states. In South Carolina, the average tax rate rose by 27% and in 
Arizona the average tax rate fell by 11 %. Both states experienced considerable volatility 
from 1987 to 2002. Because health insurance premiums were untaxed, firms were more 
likely to provide benefits in states or in years of high income tax rates. 
In apparent response to the dramatic increase in the cost of providing health 
insurance, firms cut back on both health insurance provision and the quality of benefits 
offered. As demonstrated in Figure 2.3, the proportion of single workers covered by firm-
provided health insurance fell from 63% to 61 % between 1987 and 2002. 
We found that nonmetro workers were less likely than metro workers to be covered 
by health insurance through their employer. This gap narrowed over the time period studied. 
In 1987, 56% of nonmetro workers and 67% of metro workers were covered by firm-
provided health insurance. In 2002, this proportion had changed to 57% for nonmetro 
workers and 65% for metro workers. Though most nonmetro gain occurred right after a low 
point in 1996, the net change has been a reduction of metro and an increase in nonmetro 
coverage. 
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Employees in large firms were more likely to be covered by firm-provided health 
insurance than employees in small firms, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. About 77% of 
employees in the largest firms, those with more than 999 employees, were covered by 
health insurance through their employer across the sample period. This contrasted with only 
37% in the smallest firms, or those firms with less than 25 employees. The most significant 
increase in the proportion of employees covered by firm-provided health insurance occurred 
when a firm reached the second size group of 25 employees.4 
Firms that have continued to offer health insurance benefits appear to have cut back 
significantly on the quality of benefits offered. Average real employer contributions for health 
insurance benefits across all firms only rose 42% over the time period, considerably short of 
the 104% increase in insurance costs. As discussed by Cutler and Madrian (1998), the 
average cost of benefits cannot be used as a measure of the price of health insurance 
because the expenditures are the product of exogenous prices and endogenous benefit 
quality. As shown in Table 2.5, the time path of employer health insurance expenditures per 
worker understates the actual increase in the price of health insurance by 59 percentage 
points. 
Real employer contributions followed a similar pattern for employees in both metro 
and nonmetro areas, as shown in Figure 2.5. However, small employers increased their 
contributions more than large employers. As illustrated in Figure 2.6, real employer 
contributions for health insurance by the smallest firms rose by 47% over the sample period. 
This compared to an increase of only 34% for the largest firms. However, regardless of the 
segment chosen, the quality of health insurance benefits clearly declined from 1987 to 2002. 
When we looked only at employers who continued to provide health insurance 
benefits over the time period, employer expenditures rose only 45% compared to the 
increase in prices of 104%. As shown in Figure 2.7, though we found that both groups 
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followed the same general trends, metro employers increased their contributions more than 
nonmetro employers. This caused the metro-nonmetro gap to widen over the period studied. 
Including only the employers who provided health insurance, small and large employers 
contributed close to the same for health insurance. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 2.8, the 
firm-size gap narrowed between 1987 and 2002. In 1994, small employers actually 
contributed more than large employers to health insurance benefits. 
Real hourly wages rose by 17% from 1987 to 2002, during this same period of rising 
health insurance costs, so it is possible that employers substituted wages for contributions 
to health insurance. As demonstrated in Figure 2.9, nonmetro workers received lower real 
hourly wages than metro workers. This regional gap was relatively stable over the time 
period. Consistent with other studies (see Brown and Medoff, 1990; Troske, 1999), 
employees in small firms had lower real hourly wages than employees in large firms. We 
found it interesting that, as shown in Figure 2.10, the gap between the smallest and largest 
firms narrowed from 1987 to 2002. Real hourly wages for employees in firms with less than 
25 employees rose by 20%, compared with only 11 % in firms with more than 1,000 
employees. 
Table 2.6 reports summary statistics for each dependent variable by metro status 
and the five different firm sizes. To illustrate key changes over the sample period, means are 
provided for 1987 and 2002. 
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Tables & Figures 
T bl 2 1 P a e ercent o f W k . h F P "d d H I h I or ers wit irm- rov1 e eat nsurance c overaQe 
Year All Workers Single Workers 
1987 63.2% 65.1% 
1988 62.6% 65.4% 
1989 62.1% 65.6% 
1990 61.1% 63.7% 
1991 59.9% 62.9% 
1992 58.8% 61.7% 
1993 59.7% 61.2% 
1994 60.5% 63.3% 
1995 59.4% 61.5% 
1996 59.9% 62.1% 
1997 60.1% 62.5% 
1998 61.3% 64.2% 
1999 60.8% 65.0% 
2000 62.6% 66.5% 
2001 61.8% 65.5% 
2002 60.8% 63.7% 
Note: Author comp1lat1on of average values for employees in the Current Population Survey, 
various years. Sample statistics are corrected for sample weights. 
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T bl 2 2 S a e .. 1 st r r ampe a IS ICS an dD f T e1rn1ons 
Variable Mean Standard Description of Variable 
Deviation 
BEN 0.637 0.481 Dummy variable: Indicates employer 
provides health insurance contribution 
CON 1332.715 1399.512 Employer health insurance contribution 
In CON 4.749 3.625 Log of one plus the employer health 
insurance contribution 
WAGE 13.368 13.123 Hourly wage last year 
lnW 2.358 0.694 Log of hourly wage last year 
INSPRICE 3560.478 1394.964 Cost of insurance 
In (PRICE) 8.104 0.385 Log of the cost of insurance 
FT 0.898 0.302 Dummy variable: Worked full-time at least 
part of the prior year 
MICROER 0.233 0.423 Dummy variable: Employed by a firm with 
<25 employees 
SMER 0.149 0.356 Dummy variable: Employed by a firm with 
25-99 employees 
MEDER 0.162 0.369 Dummy variable: Employed by a firm with 
100-499 employees 
LGER 0.063 0.242 Dummy variable: Employed by a firm with 
500-999 employees 
INSTER 0.392 0.488 Dummy variable: Employed by a firm with 
1000+ employees 
FEMALE 0.487 0.500 Dummy variable: Female 
BLACK 0.166 0.372 Dummy variable: Black 
OTHMIN 0.040 0.196 Dummy variable: Other minority groups 
WIDOW 0.046 0.209 Dummy variable: Widowed 
DIVOR 0.378 0.485 Dummy variable: Divorced 
CHILD<18 0.304 0.715 Number of children never married <18 in 
family 
UNION 0.035 0.185 Dummy variable: Member of a labor union or 
covered by a labor union 
EXP 18.529 10.153 Age-years of education-6 
EDUC 13.189 2.628 Index of education level (from O: none to 18: 
Master's degree or beyond) 
TAX 0.218 0.036 Average sum of state and federal marginal 
tax rate in the state 
In (STEARN) 2.520 0.163 Log of state average manufacturing earnings 
In (PLANO) 7.312 0.688 Log of state average farmland value 
URATE 5.534 1.464 State unemployment rate 
In (CPI) 5.400 0.120 Log of the consumer price index 
METRO 0.851 0.356 Dummy variable: Metropolitan residence 
AGE 37.718 9.673 Age 
Number of Observations= 249,821 
Note: Author compilation of average values for single employees in the Current Population 
Survey, various years. Sample statistics are corrected for sample weights. 
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T bl 2 3 S a e I S ampe b M t St t tat1st1cs, >Y e ro a us 
Variable Mean: Metro Mean: Nonmetro 
BEN .651 .558 
(.477) (.497) 
CON 1398.182 959.441 
(1423.612} (1186.142} 
In CON 4.879 4.011 
(3.610) (3.625) 
WAGE 13.870 10.503 
(13.451) (10.620) 
lnW 2.398 2.128 
(.687) (.685) 
FT 0.901 0.882 
(0.298) (.322) 
MICROER 0.225 0.283 
(0.417) (.450} 
SMER 0.148 0.153 
(0.355) (.360) 
MEDER 0.157 0.194 
(0.364) (.395) 
LGER 0.063 0.064 
(0.242) (.244} 
INSTER 0.407 0.307 
(0.491) (.461) 
FEMALE 0.488 0.477 
(0.500} (.499} 
BLACK 0.172 0.129 
(0.377) (.335) 
OTHMIN 0.042 0.025 
(0.202} ( .158} 
WIDOW 0.043 0.060 
(.204} (.238) 
DIVOR 0.364 0.462 
(0.481) (.499) 
CHILD<18 0.293 0.368 
(0.703) (.778) 
UNION 0.036 0.030 
(0.187} (.170) 
EXP 18.274 19.984 
(10.129) (10.171} 
EDUC 13.300 12.559 
(2.654) (2.380) 
TAX 0.218 0.215 
(0.036) (.036) 
In (STEARN) 2.525 2.490 
(0.160) (.176) 
In (PLAND} 7.363 7.023 
(0.684) (.631) 
URATE 5.573 5.311 
(1.462) (1.458) 
In (CPI} 5.401 5.395 
(0.120) ( .120) 
AGE 37.574 38.543 
(9.655) (9.735) 
Number of Observations 203,453 46,368 
Note: Author compilation of average values for single employees in the Current Population Survey, various 
years. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Sample statistics are corrected for sample weights. 
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T bl 2 4 S a e 1 st r r b F s· ampe a IS ICS, 1y 1rm 1ze 
Variable Mean: <25 Mean: 25-99 Mean: 100-499 Mean: 500-999 Mean: 1000+ 
employees employees employees employees employees 
BEN 0.372 0.601 0.696 0.747 0.767 
(0.483) (0.490) (0.460) (0.435) (0.423) 
CON 757.946 1205.763 1420.979 1548.455 1651.528 
(1236.185) (1339.993) (1357.092) (1377.210) (1421.244) 
In CON 2.759 4.455 5.173 5.558 5.739 
(3.612) (3.668) (3.466) (3.292) (3.220) 
WAGE 11.281 12.224 13.191 14.218 14.979 
(12.719) (12.508) (12.821) (13.975) (13.346) 
lnW 2.152 2.271 2.357 2.437 2.501 
(0.734) (0.689) (0.678) (0.667) (0.644) 
FT 0.841 0.907 0.921 0.923 0.916 
(0.365) (0.290) (0.270) (0.267) (0.278) 
FEMALE 0.425 0.440 0.498 0.536 0.529 
(0.494) (0.496) (0.500) (0.499) (0.499) 
BLACK 0.125 0.143 0.162 0.180 0.198 
(0.330) (0.350) (0.369) (0.384) (0.398) 
OTHMIN 0.040 0.037 0.039 0.042 0.041 
(0.196) (0.190) (0.194) (0.202) (0.197) 
WIDOW 0.046 0.044 0.048 0.049 0.045 
(0.210) (.206) (.214) (.217) (.207) 
DIVOR 0.371 0.365 0.379 0.388 0.386 
(0.483) (0.482) (0.485) (0.487) (0.487) 
CHILD<18 0.298 0.308 0.307 0.312 0.304 
(0.716) (0.729) (0.715) (0.714) (0.710) 
UNION 0.010 0.023 0.038 0.041 0.053 
(0.101) (0.150) (0.191) (0.199) (0.224) 
EXP 18.729 18.221 18.636 18.601 18.471 
(10.125) (10.078) (10.175) (10.149) (10.187) 
EDUC 12.629 12.859 13.169 13.483 13.610 
(2.735) (2.706) (2.679) (2.560) (2.436) 
TAX 0.216 0.218 0.219 0.219 0.218 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
In (STEARN) 2.516 2.519 2.522 2.525 2.520 
(0.162) (0.163) (0.164) (0.163) (0.163) 
In (PLANO) 7.300 7.316 7.326 7.339 7.308 
(0.699) (0.696) (0.681) (0.678) (0.681) 
URA TE 5.580 5.551 5.516 5.501 5.512 
(1.473) (1.475) (1.469) (1.461) (1.453) 
In (CPI) 5.401 5.397 5.397 5.402 5.401 
(0.119) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) 
METRO .819 .847 .821 .849 .883 
(.385) (.360) (.383) (.358) (.321) 
AGE 37.358 37.080 37.805 38.084 38.081 
(9.646) (9.534) (9.670) (9.673) (9.722) 
Number of 59,074 37,855 40,753 15,597 96,542 
Observations 
Note: Author compilation of average values for single employees in the Current Population Survey, various 
years. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Sample statistics are corrected for sample weights. 
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T bl 2 5 A R II C t T R t d B ft L I 1987 2002 a e .. veraoe ea nsurance oss, ax a es, an ene 1 eves, -
1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 
Insurance Cost lndex8 •0 1.0 1.12 1.34 1.53 1.59 
Benefit Level lndexa 1.0 1.11 1.30 1.32 1.22 
Coveraoe Ratec .63 .61 .59 .60 .61 
Benefit Level Index for 1.0 1.13 1.38 1.38 1.22 
Covered Employeesa,d 
Marginal Tax Rate 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.23 
Source: Author comp1lat1on of average values for single employees in the Current 
Population Surveys, various years. Corrected for sample weights. 
a In constant 1977 dollars. 
2002 
2.04 
1.42 
.61 
1.45 
0.21 
b Based on data provided by a national insurance company and the Source Book of Health 
Insurance Data. 
c Proportion of employees covered by firm-provided health insurance benefits. 
d Excludes all employees who are not covered by firm-provided health insurance benefits. 
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Table 2.6: Mean Values of Dependent Variables, 1987 and 2002 
% Covered by Firm- Real Employer Real Hourly Wage0 
provided Health Contribution for 
Insurance Health lnsurancea b 
1987 2002 1987 2002 1987 2002 
Metro 66.7 64.8 875.1 1235.8 10.0 11.7 
Nonmetro 56.2 57.3 587.7 834.6 7.4 8.6 
<25 employees 38.4 37.8 454.8 666.6 7.5 9.0 
25-99 employees 60.2 60.3 733.9 1105.2 8.7 11.0 
100-499 employees 68.3 71.0 834.6 1294.2 9.3 11.5 
500-999 employees 77.2 74.0 953.0 1356.4 10.4 11.9 
>999 employees 79.7 76.1 1074.9 1439.9 11.2 12.5 
Note: Author compilation of average values tor single employees in the Current Population Survey. 
Corrected tor sample weights. 
a Averages include zeroes tor firms not providing health insurance. 
b Base CPI year = 1987. 
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Chapter 3: Metro-nonmetro Differences in Health Insurance Coverage, 
Health Insurance Quality, and Wages 
Empirical Model 
We use the following probit model to determine the underlying factors influencing 
whether an individual is covered by employer-provided health insurance. Where possible, 
we transform variables into logarithmic form so that their associated coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
(3.1) BEN= B 0 + B 1 ln(price) + B 2 ft + B 3firmsz + B 4 tax + B 5metro + B 6 P + B 7 r + B 8 Z 
+ B9L + eBEN 
where BEN is a binary indicator of whether the individual is covered by firm-provided health 
insurance, tax is the marginal tax rate, Pis a vector of cost of living measures, r is a vector 
of personal characteristics, L is a vector of local labor market conditions, Z is a vector of 
skills. Ft and metro are dummy variables for full-time status and metropolitan residence 
respectively. Firmsz is a dummy variable for the size of the employer, which we use as an 
indicator of the fixed capital. 
We apply the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model to determine the 
underlying factors driving an employer's contribution to health insurance. Where possible, 
we transform variables into logarithmic form so that their associated coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
(3.2) In CON= B 0 + B 1 ln(price) + B 2ft + B 3firmsz + B 4 tax + B 5 metro + B 6 P + B 7 r + 
B 8Z + B 9L + ecoN 
where CON is a continuous measure of the dollar amount the employer contributes to health 
insurance and all other variables are as defined in Equation 3.1. Since the natural log must 
be greater than 0, we change the dollar amount of an employer's contribution from $0 to $1 
if they do not provide health insurance. 
51 
We utilize the following OLS model to determine the underlying factors affecting an 
employer's wage decision. Where possible, we transform variables into logarithmic form so 
that their associated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. 
(3.3) In W = B0 + B1 ln(price) + B/ t + Blirmsz + B4tax + B5metro + B6P + B7r + B8Z + 
B9L+ew 
where W is the individual's hourly wage and all other variables are as defined in Equation 
3.1 . 
One of our objectives is to identify the underlying reasons for the difference in health 
insurance benefits and wages between workers residing in metro and nonmetro areas. We 
also want to investigate why these differences have changed over time. To accomplish this, 
we split the data set into metro and nonmetro regions and use the models identified in 
Equations 3.1 through 3.3. In each case, we run a separate model that interacts metro 
status with each independent variable to determine whether the metro-nonmetro difference 
is statistically significant. 
Results 
Firm-provided health insurance coverage and quality. The first column in Table 3.1 
reports the estimates with firm provided health insurance coverage as the dependent 
variable. The second column in Table 3.1 reports the estimates using the employer 
contribution to health insurance as the dependent variable. All independent variables are 
significant at the .01 level. As expected, employees working for firms that face higher 
insurance costs are significantly less likely to be covered by employer-provided health 
insurance. A 10% increase in health insurance premiums causes a 0.4% decrease in the 
probability of getting benefits. Additionally, the employer's contribution to health insurance 
decreases as the cost of health insurance rises. A 10% increase in health insurance 
premiums causes a 1.4% decrease in real employer contributions. 
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Higher average state and federal marginal income tax rates lead to a higher 
probability of firm-provided health insurance coverage. A 10% increase in the marginal tax 
rate raises the probability of health insurance coverage by 1.2%. Higher marginal income 
tax rates also lead to a higher employer contribution for health insurance. A 10% increase in 
the marginal tax rate raises the employer contribution for health insurance by 6.3%. 
In Figure 3.1, we show how the estimated probability of firm-provided health 
insurance coverage changes holding the cost of health insurance and marginal tax rates 
fixed at their 1987 values. The sample means of all other variables are allowed to change 
each year. Our simulation demonstrates that the estimated probability of health insurance 
coverage in 2002 would be 66. 7% instead of 62.1 % if prices and taxes had remained at their 
1987 level. The rising cost of health insurance accounts for the majority of this difference. 
In Figure 3.2, we present a similar simulation for the log of employer contributions to 
health insurance. As before, we hold the cost of health insurance and marginal tax rates 
fixed at their 1987 values and allow the sample means of all other variables to change each 
year. Our simulation shows that the log of employer contributions would be 5.0 instead of 
4.8 if prices and taxes had remained at their 1987 levels. This implies that contributions 
decreased by 18.2% from 1987 to 2002 due to changes in prices and taxes. Again, the 
rising cost of health insurance accounts for the majority of this decrease. 
A number of other independent variables in our equation influenced health insurance 
benefits. First, the probability of firm-provided health insurance coverage and the quality of 
this insurance rises with skill. At the sample means, the probability of health insurance 
coverage rises by 0.5% per year of experience and 4.1 % per year of educational attainment. 
The corresponding impacts on an employer's contribution to health insurance are 3.3% per 
year of experience and 26% per added education level. Second, both the probabil ity of 
benefits and the employer contribution to benefits are higher for whites, females , and those 
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covered by a union.5 Third, employees in the smallest firms are 36.9% less likely to be 
covered by firm-provided health insurance than employees in the largest firms and receive 
91.4% lower contributions to health insurance. Finally, employees in areas with rising 
employment are significantly more likely to be covered by employer-provided health 
insurance, and also receive a higher quality of health insurance. This suggests that benefits 
are used to attract or retain workers as labor markets tighten. 
Firm-provided health insurance coverage, by metro status. Workers residing in metro 
areas are 5.3% more likely to be covered by employer-provided health insurance than 
workers residing in nonmetro areas, holding everything else constant. The first column in 
Table 3.2 reports the estimates for metro areas using health insurance coverage through an 
employer as the dependent variable. The second column in Table 3.2 reports similar 
estimates for nonmetro areas. The third column in Table 3.2 reports whether these 
estimates are significantly different between metro and nonmetro areas. All independent 
variables are significant at the .01 level. 
We found that health insurance costs, taxes, and union coverage have significantly 
larger effects in nonmetro areas. Our calculations show a 10% increase in health insurance 
premiums causes a 0.7% decrease in the probability of health insurance coverage for 
nonmetro residents and a 0.4% decrease for metro residents. The tax elasticity is 0.20 in 
nonmetro areas and 0.10 in metro areas. This implies a 10% increase in tax rates in 
nonmetro areas will raise the probability of health insurance coverage by 2.0%. The 
corresponding effect in metro areas is only 1 .0%. Nonmetro residents covered by a union 
are 21.1 % more likely to have health insurance coverage than nonmetro residents not 
covered by a union. The corresponding effect in metro areas is only 15.4%. 
In Figure 3.3, we show how the estimated probability of being covered by firm-
provided health insurance changes for residents in metro and nonmetro areas holding 
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health insurance costs and tax rates fixed at their 1987 value. The sample means of all 
other variables are allowed to change each year. Our simulation demonstrates that the 
estimated probability of health insurance coverage for metro areas in 2002 would be 68.3% 
instead of 63.4% if prices and taxes had remained at their 1987 levels. The estimated 
probability of health insurance coverage for nonmetro areas would be 57.7% instead of 
53.8%. 
Employer's contribution to health insurance, by metro status. Workers residing in 
metro areas receive 61 % higher employer contributions to benefits than do workers residing 
in nonmetro areas, holding everything else constant. The first column in Table 3.3 reports 
the estimates for metro areas using the employer contribution to health insurance as the 
dependent variable. The second column in Table 3.3 reports similar estimates for nonmetro 
areas. The third column in Table 3.3 reports whether these estimates are significantly 
different between metro and nonmetro areas. All independent variables are significant at the 
.01 level. 
Health insurance costs and union coverage have significantly larger effects for 
non metro residents. A 10% increase in health insurance premiums causes a 3.3% decrease 
in real employer contributions for nonmetro residents and a 1.3% decrease for metro 
residents. Nonmetro residents covered by a union receive 250% higher contributions to 
health insurance than nonmetro residents not covered by a union. The corresponding effect 
in metro areas is less at 181 %. 
Conversely, gender and tax rates have significantly smaller effects for nonmetro 
residents . Females residing in nonmetro areas receive a 9.4% lower employer contribution 
than males residing in nonmetro areas. On the other hand, females in metro areas receive a 
26% higher employer contribution than males in metro areas. The tax elasticity is 0.66 in 
metro areas and 0.60 in nonmetro areas. This implies a 10% increase in tax rates in metro 
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areas will raise the employer contribution to benefits by 6.6%. The corresponding effect in 
nonmetro areas is only 6.0%. 
In Figure 3.4, we show how the log of employer contributions to health insurance 
changes for residents in metro and nonmetro areas holding the health insurance costs and 
tax rates at their 1987 value. The sample means of all other variables are allowed to change 
each year. The simulation shows that the log of employer contributions in metro areas would 
be 5.1 instead of 4.9 in 2002 if prices and taxes had remained at their 1987 levels. The log 
of employer contributions in nonmetro areas would be 4.4 instead of 4.0. This implies that 
the changes in prices and taxes between 1987 and 2002 lowered contributions to health 
insurance by 17.9% in metro areas and 32.4% in nonmetro areas. 
Workers residing in nonmetro areas are more likely to work for a small employer, a 
factor that causes lower health insurance coverage and contributions. The Center for the 
Study of Rural America (2001) found that approximately three-fourths of all rural firms (over 
a million firms) had fewer than 20 employees in 1998. In our sample, 28% of nonmetro 
residents are employed by the smallest firms with less than 25 employees. In contrast, only 
22% of metro residents are employed by the smallest firms. As discussed before, benefits 
provision and quality is lower in small firms. 
Hourly wages. Table 3.4 reports the estimates with the log of wage as the dependent 
variable. All independent variables are significant at the .01 level. We find that wages 
increase in response to higher health insurance costs, as would be expected if firms trade 
off wages and benefits. A 10% increase in health insurance premiums causes a 1.5% 
increase in wages. Higher average state and federal marginal income tax rates also lead to 
higher wages. The tax elasticity is 0.21. Therefore, a 10% increase in the tax rate causes a 
2.1 % increase in wages. The positive effect of income taxes on wages suggests that some 
of the incidence of the income tax is shifted from workers to firms. 
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We examine the effect of other key variables on wages, outside of cost and taxes. 
First, we found that wages rise with skill. At the sample mean, wages rise by 0.9% per year 
of experience and 9.7% per year of educational attainment. Second, wages are higher for 
whites, males, and those covered by a union. Finally, the unemployment rate has very little 
impact on wages. 
In Figure 3.5, we show how the log of wages changes holding the cost of health 
insurance and marginal tax rates at their 1987 value. The sample means of all other 
variables are allowed to change each year. The simulation shows that wages would be 2.4 
instead of 2.6 if prices and taxes had remained at their 1987 level. This implies that wages 
increased by 17.9% from 1987 to 2002 due to the changes in prices and taxes. The cost of 
health insurance accounts for the majority of this decrease. 
In Figure 3.6, we demonstrate the tradeoff between wages and benefits through a 
simulation. We allow the cost of health insurance and marginal tax rates to vary, while 
holding the sample means of all other variables fixed at their 1987 value. In response to 
rising health insurance costs and changing tax rates, the employer's contribution to health 
insurance decreases and wages increase. The correlation between wages and the 
employer's contribution in the simulation is -0.79. 
Hourly wages, by metro status. Workers residing in metro areas receive 17% higher 
wages than workers residing in nonmetro areas, holding everything else constant. The first 
column in Table 3.5 reports the estimates for metro areas using the log of wages as the 
dependent variable. The second column in Table 3.5 reports similar estimates for nonmetro 
areas. The third column in Table 3.5 reports whether these estimates are significantly 
different between metro and nonmetro areas. All independent variables are significant at the 
.01 level. 
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Health insurance costs and tax rates have significantly larger effects in metro areas. 
A 10% increase in health insurance premiums causes a 1. 7% increase in wages for metro 
residents and a 0.4% increase for nonmetro residents. The tax elasticity is 0.23 in metro 
areas and 0.09 in nonmetro areas. This implies a 10% increase in tax rates in metro areas 
will raise wages by 2.3%. The corresponding effect in nonmetro areas is only 0.9%. 
In Figure 3.7, we show how the log of wages changes for residents in metro and 
nonmetro areas holding health insurance costs and tax rates fixed at their 1987 value. The 
sample means of all other variables are allowed to change each year. Rising health 
insurance costs widened the metro-nonmetro wage gap. The simulation shows that the log 
of wages in metro areas would be 2.4 instead of 2.6 if prices and taxes had remained at 
their 1987 level. The log of wages in nonmetro areas would be 2.3 instead of 2.4 if prices 
and taxes had remained at their 1987 level. This implies that the changes in prices and 
taxes between 1987 and 2002 increased wages by 18.6% in metro areas and 4.3% in 
nonmetro areas. 
Decomposition of Metro-nonmetro Gaps 
We estimate how much of the observed differences in firm-provided health insurance 
coverage between workers residing in metro and nonmetro areas can be explained by our 
model using a variation of Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) 
adapted to the probit regression model. The original Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions 
assumed a linear regression model. However, a probit model cannot be decomposed 
exactly because it is nonlinear. Some studies use the coefficient estimates from a linear 
probability model to approximate the decomposition (Fairlie, 2004; Kilkenny and Huffman, 
2003). The potential problem is that the linear probability model is sensitive to outliers and it 
is possible to have an estimated probability over 1 or under 0. Our decomposition strategy 
follows that of Moohoun Song (2005). 
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The explained difference between metro and nonmetro health insurance coverage is 
where F is the normal density function, DsEN is the observed difference in health insurance 
coverage between metro and nonmetro areas, X is a vector of average values of all the 
independent variable in area j and fJ is a vector of the coefficient in area j. We calculate the 
share of each variable i in explaining this gap by 
(
-M _ - NM ){JM x . x . . x . = I I I 
1 (X M _ X NM ) fJ M 
where x/ is the average value of independent variable i in area j and B/1' is the associated 
coefficient estimate. By multiplying Dben by Xi we can estimate the explained metro-nonmetro 
difference attributable to independent variable i. 
The first column in Table 3.6 reports the results from this decomposition. Negative 
values mean the variable lowers the difference between metro and nonmetro areas while 
positive numbers increase the difference. The total difference in firm-provided health 
insurance coverage is 11.1 %. Overall, our model explains 5.6% of the difference in 
coverage, leaving 5.5% unexplained. Lower education levels in nonmetro areas are 
responsible for the largest portion of the explained gap, or 82%. This is partially offset by 
higher experience in nonmetro areas, which serves to shrink the gap. The higher incidence 
of workers employed by the smallest firms in nonmetro areas accounts for 37% of the 
explained gap. Even though the cost of health insurance and the marginal tax rate have 
significant effects on the probability of health insurance coverage, they explain little of the 
gap in coverage between metro and nonmetro areas. Marginal tax rates do not vary greatly 
between metro and nonmetro areas, and so they cannot explain the gap. There is a more 
substantial difference in average health insurance costs across metro and nonmetro areas, 
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but the gap favors rural firms. Nevertheless, the firm response to health insurance price is 
too inelastic for the cost difference to explain much of the gap in firm provision. 
Next, we estimate how much of the observed difference in the employer's 
contribution to health insurance between workers residing in metro and nonmetro areas can 
be explained by our model. Because our model is linear, we are able to use the original 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The explained difference between metro and nonmetro 
areas is 
where D1n coN is the observed difference in an employer's contribution to health insurance 
between metro and nonmetro areas, X is a vector of average values of all the independent 
variable in area j and f3 is a vector of the coefficient in area j. We calculate the share of 
each variable i in explaining this gap by 
(- M _- NM )/3M x . x . . x . = I I I 
I (XM -XNM)/3M 
where x/ is an average value of independent variable i in area j and B im is the associated 
coefficient estimate. 
The second column in Table 3.6 reports the results from this decomposition. 
Negative values mean the variable lowers the difference between metro and nonmetro 
areas while positive values increase the difference. The total difference in the log of the 
employer's contribution to health insurance is 0.88. Overall, our model explains 0.4 of the 
difference in the employer's contribution, leaving 0.48 unexplained. In other words, our 
model explains 45% of the difference. Our results are very similar to the health insurance 
coverage decomposition. Lower education levels in nonmetro areas are responsible for the 
largest portion of the explained gap, at 77%. This is partially offset by higher experience in 
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nonmetro areas, which serves to shrink the gap. The higher incidence of nonmetro residents 
employed by the smallest firms accounts for 35% of the explained gap in employer 
contributions. Local labor market conditions, such as the unemployment rate and union 
coverage, are responsible for 15.6% of the explained gap. Health insurance costs and 
marginal tax rates explain little of the difference in an employer's contributions to health 
insurance between residents in metro and nonmetro areas. 
Last, we estimate how much of the observed differences in wages between workers 
residing in metro and nonmetro areas can be explained by our model. Because our model is 
linear, we are able to use the original Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The explained 
difference between metro and nonmetro areas is 
where D1n w is the observed difference in wages between metro and non metro areas, X is a 
vector of average values of all the independent variable in area j and /3 is a vector of the 
coefficient in area j. We calculate the share of each variable i in explaining this gap by 
(
-M _-NM )/JM x . x . . x. = I I I 
I ( x M _ x NM ) /3M 
where i/ is an average value of independent variable i in area j and B
1
m is the associated 
coefficient estimate. 
The third column in Table 3.6 reports the results from this decomposition. Negative 
values mean the variable lowers the difference between metro and nonmetro areas while 
positive numbers increase the difference. The total difference in the log of wages is 0.28. 
Overall, our model explains 0.12 of the difference in the log of wages, leaving 0.16 
unexplained. In other words, our model explains 43% of the difference. Our results for 
wages vary somewhat from the benefit decompositions. Health insurance costs account for 
61 
21.9% of the explained gap, a substantial portion. The higher incidence of nonmetro 
residents employed by the smallest firms is responsible for 12.3% of the explained gap, a 
smaller fraction than that found in the benefit decompositions. Personal characteristics such 
as gender and race serve to shrink the gap. Similar to prior results, education still explains 
the largest portion of the gap. Also, marginal tax rates explain little of the difference in 
wages between workers residing in metro and nonmetro areas. 
Conclusions 
Our first objective was to determine the impact of rising health insurance costs on 
health insurance coverage, health insurance quality, and wages. We found that the 
increased cost of health insurance had a substantial effect on both the probability that 
employees were covered by firm-provided health insurance and the employer's contribution 
to health insurance. The 104% increase in the real price of health insurance between 1987 
and 2002 lowered the probability of health insurance coverage by 4.3% and caused firms to 
lower their contribution to health insurance by 15.8%. Importantly, firms were more apt to 
decrease the level of health insurance benefits than to eliminate the benefit completely. We 
found a clear tradeoff between wages and benefits. Wages increased by 19% over the 
sample period in response to higher health insurance costs. 
Our second objective was to determine the effect of changes in marginal tax rates on 
health insurance coverage, health insurance quality, and wages. We found empirical 
evidence that firm benefit and wage offers decline as the marginal income tax rate 
decreases. The average income tax rate fell slightly from 1987 to 2002, although there was 
significant variation in some states. The net effects of these changing tax rates over the 
sample period lowered the probability of health insurance coverage by 1 .8%, lowered the 
real employer contribution to health insurance by 4 %, and decreased real wages by 1 %. 
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Our final objective was to determine the reasons behind the difference in health 
insurance coverage, health insurance quality, and wages between residents in metro and 
nonmetro areas. We also investigated why these differences have changed over time. 
Workers who lived in metro areas were 5.3% more likely to be covered by employer-
provided health insurance than were workers who lived in nonmetro areas, holding 
everything else constant. We found that health insurance costs, taxes, and union coverage 
affected the probability of health insurance coverage more in nonmetro area than in metro 
areas. The changes in prices and taxes between 1987 and 2002 lowered the probability of 
being covered by firm-provided health insurance by 4.9% in metro areas and 3.9% in 
nonmetro areas. Our model explained around half of the difference in coverage between 
metro and nonmetro areas. Lower education levels in nonmetro areas were responsible for 
the largest portion of the explained gap. Health insurance costs and marginal tax rates 
explained very little of the difference in coverage between metro and nonmetro areas. This 
suggests that changes to insurance costs and marginal taxes alone will do little to improve 
the metro-nonmetro gap in health insurance coverage. 
Workers who lived in metro areas received 61 % higher employer contributions to 
benefits than did workers who lived in nonmetro areas, holding everything else constant. We 
determined that health insurance costs and union coverage affected the employer's 
contribution to health insurance more in nonmetro areas than in metro areas. Conversely, 
gender and tax rates had significantly smaller effects in nonmetro areas. The changes in 
prices and taxes between 1987 and 2002 lowered the real employer contribution to health 
insurance by 17.9% in metro areas and 32.4% in nonmetro areas. Our model explained 
close to half of the difference in the log of an employer's contribution to health insurance. 
Similar to our results for the health insurance coverage decomposition, lower education 
levels in nonmetro areas accounted for the largest portion of the explained gap. Again, 
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health insurance costs and marginal tax rates explained very little of the difference in an 
employer's contributions to health insurance between metro and nonmetro areas. 
Workers who lived in metro areas received 17% higher wages than workers who 
lived in nonmetro areas, holding everything else constant. We concluded that health 
insurance costs and tax rates have significantly larger effects on wages in metro areas. The 
changes in prices and taxes between 1987 and 2002 increased real wages by 18.6% in 
metro areas and 4.3% in nonmetro areas. The model explained close to half of the 
difference in the log of wage. Again, lower education levels in nonmetro areas accounted for 
the largest portion of the explained gap. Interestingly, health insurance costs were 
responsible for 21.9% of the explained gap, a substantial portion. Marginal tax rates still 
explained little of the difference in wages between metro and nonmetro areas. 
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Tables & Figures 
Table 3.1: Probit Estimation of Firm-Provided Health Insurance Coverage and OLS 
E . . f h L f th R I E I C t 'b . H I h I st1mat1on o t e og o e ea mp oyer on n ut1on to eat nsurance 
Variable BE Na In CON° 
In (PRICE) -0.025 -0.140 
(209.90) (190.64) 
FT 0.419 2.739 
(4893.20) (5429.21) 
MICROER -0.369 -2.455 
(5603.75) (6083.49) 
SMER -0.163 -1.039 
(2146.03) (2240.28) 
MEDER -0.075 -0.464 
(1016.38) (1039.43) 
LGER -0.027 -0.176 
(248.41) (272.26) 
FEMALE 0.043 0.185 
(840.74) (577.43) 
BLACK -0.091 -0.569 
(1324.65) (1354.03) 
OTHMIN -0.075 -0.397 
(588.19) (506.55) 
WIDOW -0.008 0.031 
(58.44) (38.33) 
DIVOR 0.026 0.260 
(440.13) (696.80) 
CHILD<18 -0.027 -0.066 
(763.58) (290.08) 
UNION 0.161 1.060 
(1182.64) (1293.11) 
EXP 0.023 0.180 
(964.00) (1245.76) 
EDUC 0.088 0.587 
(1202 .84) (1433.77) 
TAX 0.350 3.010 
(425.96) (588.75) 
EXP~ -0.0002 -0.001 
(580.97) (870.49) 
EDUC" -0.001 -0.008 
(500.04) (603.34) 
EDUC x EXP -0.001 -0.007 
(800.86) (1008.39) 
In {STEARN) 0.188 1.946 
(749.16) (1246.70) 
In (PLANO) 0.018 0.160 
(460.36) (650.69) 
URA TE -0.011 -0.044 
(586.43) (379.21) 
In (CPI) -0.264 -1.488 
(557.90) (507.03) 
METRO 0.053 0.475 
(742.30) (1066.91) 
CONSTANT -2.129 
(193.70) 
Predicted Probability (at x-bar) c .654 
Observed Probability .637 
R" 0.178° 0.225 
Log likelihood -2.426e+08 
Note: Frequency weighted regressions based on a sample of 249,821 single workers from 1987 to 2002. 
aDummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is covered by firm-provided health insurance. z statistics in parenthesis. 
blog of one plus the employer contribution to health insurance. t statistics in parenthesis. 
cPredicted probability at the mean value for each independent variable. 
dPseudo-R-square 
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Table 3.2: Probit Estimation of the Probability of Firm-Provided Health Insurance Coverage, 
by Metro Status 
Variable BEN: Metroa BEN: Nonmetroa z statistic for metro 
interactionb 
In (PRICE) -0.025 -0.037 25.31 
(201.83) (92.77) 
FT 0.420 0.404 8.14 
(4515.71) (1874.76) 
MICROER -0.366 -0.373 18.28 
(5136.34) (2176.15) 
SMER -0.161 -0.161 29.23 
(1979.94) (786.77) 
MEDER -0.083 -0.032 263.08 
(1034.16) (166.85) 
LGER -0.034 0.019 174.55 
(293.23) (64.43) 
FEMALE 0.048 0.010 278.34 
(881.74) (69.31) 
BLACK -0.088 -0.099 23.61 
(1224.36) (461.71) 
OTHMIN -0.070 -0.119 95.88 
(525.17) (267.44) 
WIDOW -0.007 -0.009 6.9 
(46.04) (27.92) 
DIVOR 0.026 0.025 17.93 
(400.42) (159.69) 
CHILD<18 -0.028 -0.023 63.36 
(715.61) (252.50) 
UNION 0.154 0.211 79.19 
(1077.26) (495.67) 
EXP 0.022 0.028 67.36 
(859.78) (430.48) 
EDUC 0.086 0.096 10.01 
(1120.58) (420.89) 
TAX 0.313 0.529 74.05 
(354.98) (236.38) 
EXP" -0.0001 -0.0002 108.8 
(-488.88) (327.85) 
EDUC" -0.001 -0.001 16.93 
(463.51) (182.94) 
EDUC x EXP -0.001 -0.001 17.89 
(731.34) (309.22) 
In (STEARN) 0.172 0.269 118.25 
(625.48) (421.59) 
In (PLANO) 0.015 0.036 151 .83 
(368.48) (302.86) 
URA TE -0.010 -0.018 138.42 
(485.76) (350.88) 
In (CPI) -0.233 -.413 102.68 
(466.54) (285.68) 
Pred. Probability (at x-bar) c .670 .560 
Obs. Probability .651 .559 
Pseudo R" 0.175 0.18 
Log likelihood -2.047e+08 -37708190 
Note: Frequency weighted regressions based on a sample of 249,821 single workers from 1987 to 2002. 
3 0ummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is covered by firm-provided health insurance. z statistics in parenthesis. 
bz statistics from the interaction of metro status with each independent variable. 
cPredicted probability at the mean value for each independent variable. 
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Table 3.3: Estimation of the Log of the Real Employer Contribution for Health Insurance, by 
Metro Status 
Variable In CON: Metroa In CON: Nonmetro3 t statistic for metro 
interactionb 
In (PRICE) -.127 -0.326 
(162.96) (141.79) 84.19 
FT 2.789 2.476 
(5047.85) (1999.82) 228.03 
MICROER -2.450 -2.467 
(5580.49) (2369.74) 14.59 
SMER -1 .023 -1 .087 
(2041 .78) (881.77) 50.21 
MEDER -0.498 -0.263 
(1024.55) (231 .88) 190.09 
LGER -0.210 0.052 
(299.57) (30.48) 142.9 
FEMALE 0.232 -0.099 
(671.08) (117.60) 364.56 
BLACK -0.557 -0.609 
(1245.02) (478.24) 37.34 
OTHMIN -0.373 -0.635 
(454.21) (242.69) 95.65 
WIDOW 0.047 0.001 
(52.47) (0.69) 23.9 
DIVOR 0.264 0.231 
(649.22) (245.70) 34.17 
CHILD<18 -0.074 -0.009 
(296.59) (17.07) 103.29 
UNION 1.032 1.254 
(1177.10) (544.11) 87.37 
EXP 0.176 0.193 
(1128.20) (509.50) 42.49 
EDUC 0.595 0.533 
(1358.45) (452.18) 47.75 
TAX 3.032 2.787 
(545.49) (210.60) 20.17 
EXP2 -0.001 -0.002 
(764.26) (423.31) 92.72 
EDUC2 -0.008 -0.007 
(582.31) (178.11) 30.58 
EDUC x EXP -0.007 -0.007 
(930.79) (352.06) 12.36 
In (STEARN) 1.832 2.441 
(1059.41) (648.80) 148.63 
In (PLANO) 0.147 0.243 
(558.04) (346.70) 128.89 
URATE -0.032 -0.113 
(259.90) (-370.80) 246.29 
In (CPI) -1.279 -2.362 
(406.38) (279.52) 119.53 
Constant -2.671 3.346 
(226.49) (111.77) 
R<:'. 0.219 0.228 
Note: Frequency weighted regressions based on a sample of 249,821 single workers from 1987 to 2002. 
aLog of one plus the employer contribution to health insurance. t statistics in parenthesis. 
bt statistics from the interaction of metro status with each independent variable. 
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T bl 3 4 E . f h L f h W a e .. st1mat1on o t e og o t e E age ~quat1on 
Variable In wa t statistic 
In (PRICE) 0.154 1126.27 
FT 0.233 2478.91 
MICROER -0.248 3308.27 
SMER -0.154 1778.99 
MEDER -0.097 1163.26 
LGER -0.052 436.12 
FEMALE -0.138 2314.54 
BLACK -0.133 1697.26 
OTHMIN -0.032 220 
WIDOW 0.031 204.77 
DIVOR 0.082 1187.43 
CHILD<18 -0.017 406.17 
UNION 0.113 744.29 
EXP 0.031 1165.09 
EDUC 0.059 774.55 
TAX 0.970 1019.85 
EXPL -.0004 1283.22 
EDU CL .002 785.56 
EDUC x EXP -.001 427.2 
In (STEARN) 0.202 694.69 
In (PLANO) 0.036 776.08 
URATE -0.006 272.01 
In (CPI) 0.458 838.25 
METRO 0.158 1908.63 
Constant -3.875 1894.3 
R2 0.267 
Note: Frequency weighted regressions based on a sample of 249,821 single workers from 
1987 to 2002. 
aLog of the hourly wage last year 
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T bl 3 5 E . r a e st1ma ion o f th L e og o f th w e age E r b M t St t qua ion, 1y e ro a us 
In W: Metroa IN W: Nonmetroa t statistic for metro 
interactionb 
In (PRICE) 0.165 0.037 
(1137.45) (85.35) 282.67 
FT 0.234 0.219 
(2281.39) (937.88) 60.54 
MICRO ER -0.241 -0.290 
(2961.27) (1479.77) 229.43 
SMER -0.148 -0.187 
(1585.56) (807.19) 162.89 
MEDER -0.098 -0.086 
(1088.90) (401.72) 53 .64 
LGER -0.055 -0.038 
(421.72) (117.52) 49.74 
FEMALE -0.126 -0.205 
(1970.16) (1285.65) 460.02 
BLACK -0.133 -0.126 
(1605.04) (527.12) 27.36 
OTHMIN -0.037 -0.012 
(239.78) (25.28) 44.41 
WIDOW 0.027 0.058 
(161.40) (162.84) 78.4 
DIVOR 0.080 0.098 
(1058.65) (552.71) 92.43 
CHILD<18 -0.019 -0.006 
(409.42) (61.46) 109.73 
UNION 0.100 0.213 
(614.29) (490.02) 242.08 
EXP 0.033 0.021 
(1129.97) (298.82) 147.7 
EDUC 0.059 0.062 
(731.13) (279.42) 11.53 
TAX 1.053 0.399 
(1020.07) (160.30) 245.99 
EX Pc -0.0004 -0.0002 
(1247.08) (339.09) 167.73 
EDUC2 0.002 0.001 
(769.21) (144.11) 126.21 
EDUC x EXP -0.001 -0.0003 
(422.57) (71.34) 85.8 
In (STEARN) 0.207 0.160 
(645.43) (226.38) 59.65 
In (PLANO) 0.035 0.035 
(715.60) (267.80) 3.46 
URATE -0.006 -0.007 
(252.60) (129.08) 27.52 
In (CPI) 0.418 0.861 
(715.28) (540.90) 263.15 
Constant -3.649 -4.674 
(1666.17) (829.15) 836.33 
RC 0.2567 0.2342 
Note: Frequency weighted regressions based on a sample of 249,821 single workers from 1987 to 2002. 
aLog of the hourly wage last year. t statistics in parethesis. 
bt statistics from the interaction of metro status with each independent variable. 
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T bl 3 6 Bl' d 0 a e .. 1n er- ax a ca D T W . ht d P ecompos1 ion: e1g e ercen age o fE 1· dV ·r XJ aine ana1on 
BEN2 In CON° In we 
In (PRICE) -6.9% -4.8% 21.2% 
FT 13.9% 13.1% 3.7% 
EXP -42.2% -42.9% -20.8% 
EDUC 82.0% 76.9% 72.6% 
MICROER 37.4% 35.6% 11.9% 
SMER 1.3% 1.2% 0.6% 
MEDER 5.5% 4.6% 3.1% 
LGER 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
TAX 1.6% 2.2% 2.5% 
Cost of living 7.2% 10.7% 12.1% 
Personal characteristics -8.4% -12.2% -12.5% 
Local labor market conditions 8.5% 15.6% 5.4% 
Sum 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: Author calculations based on a sample from the Current Population Survey of 249,821 
single workers from 1987 to 2002. Corrected for sample weights. 
2The total difference in firm-provided health insurance coverage is 11.1 %. 5.6% of this is 
explained, leaving 5.5% unexplained. 
tThe total difference in the log of the employer's contribution to health insurance is 0.88. 0.4 
of this is explained, leaving 0.48 unexplained. 
cThe total difference in the log of wages is 0.28. 0.12 of this is explained, leaving 0.16 
unexplained. 
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77 
Chapter 4: Firm Size Differences in Health Insurance Coverage, Health 
Insurance Quality, and Wages 
Empirical Model 
One of our objectives is to identify the underlying reasons for the difference in health 
insurance benefits and wages between different firm sizes. We also want to investigate why 
these differences have changed over time. To accomplish this, we split the sample into five 
distinct firm sizes and use the following three models. Where possible, variables are 
transformed into logarithmic form so that their associated coefficients can be interpreted as 
elasticities. 
We utilize the following probit model to determine the underlying factors influencing 
whether an individual is covered by health insurance. 
+ eBEN 
where BEN is a binary indicator of whether the individual is covered by firm-provided health 
insurance, tax is the marginal tax rate, P is a vector of cost of living measures, T is a vector 
of personal characteristics, L is a vector of local labor market conditions, and Z is a vector of 
skills. Ft and metro are dummy variables for full-time status and metropolitan residence 
respectively. 
We apply the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model to identify the underlying 
factors affecting an employer's contribution to health insurance. 
+e CON 
where CON is a continuous measure of the dollar amount the employer contributes to health 
insurance and all other variables are as defined in Equation 4.1. 
78 
We use the following OLS model to determine the underlying factors affecting an 
employer's wage decision. 
(4.3) Jn W = B0 + B1 ln(price) + BJt + B3tax + B4metro + B5P + B6r+ B7Z+ B8L + ew 
where W is the individual's hourly wage and all other variables are as defined in Equation 
4.1. 
Results 
Firm-provided health insurance coverage, by firm size. Employees in the smallest 
firms are 36.9% less likely to be covered by firm-provided health insurance than employees 
in the largest firms, holding everything else constant. Table 4.1 reports the estimates for five 
different firm sizes using health insurance coverage through an employer as the dependent 
variable. All independent variables are significant at the .01 level. 
Health insurance costs and union coverage have significantly larger effects in 
smaller firms. A 10% increase in health insurance costs causes a 0.8% decrease in the 
probability of being covered by firm-provided health insurance for workers in the smallest 
firms. The corresponding effect for workers in the largest firms is 0.07%. A significant drop in 
the size of the cost effect occurs when the firm reaches the third size group of 100 
employees. Workers in the smallest firms that are covered by a union are 17.2% more likely 
to be covered by health insurance than workers in the smallest firms that are not covered by 
a union. The corresponding effect in the largest firms is only 11.4%. 
Full-time status has a significantly larger effect in the largest firms. A significant 
increase occurs when the firm reaches the second size group of 26 employees. Employees 
in the largest firms that work full-time are 40.7% more likely to be covered by health 
insurance than workers in the largest firms that do not work full-time. The corresponding 
effect in the smallest firms is only 29.1 %. 
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Measures of skill and marginal income tax rates have close to the same effect across 
all firm sizes. At the sample mean, the probability of health insurance coverage for small firm 
workers rises by 0.2% per year of experience and 4.1 % per year of educational attainment. 
The corresponding effect for large firm workers is an increase of 0.5% per year of 
experience and 3.1 % per added educational level. A 10% increase in the marginal tax rate 
raises the probability of benefits coverage by 1 .1 % for employees in the smallest firms and 
1 .0% for employees in the largest firms. 
In Figure 4.1, we show how the estimated probability of being covered by firm-
provided health insurance changes for workers in different firm sizes holding health 
insurance costs and tax rates fixed at their 1987 value. The sample means of all other 
variables are allowed to change each year. The gap is widest at the second size group of 
26-99 employees. The simulation shows the estimated probability of health insurance 
coverage for this group would be 66.2% instead of 58.9% if prices and taxes had remained 
at their 1987 level. The estimated probability of health insurance coverage for the largest 
firms would be 77.9% instead of 74.8% if prices and taxes had remained at their 1987 level. 
Employer's contribution to health insurance, by firm size. Employees in the smallest 
firms receive 91.4% lower employer contributions to health insurance than employees in the 
largest firms, holding everything else constant. Table 4.2 reports the estimates for five 
different firm sizes using the employer contribution to health insurance as the dependent 
variable. All independent variables are significant at the .01 level. 
Health insurance costs and union coverage have significantly larger effects in 
smaller firms. A 10% increase in health insurance premiums causes a 2.2% decrease in 
employer contributions to health insurance for workers in the smallest firms and only a 
negligible decrease for workers in the largest firms. A significant drop in the size of the cost 
effect occurs when the firm reaches the third size group of 100 employees. Workers in the 
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smallest firms that are covered by a union receive 271. 7% higher employer contributions to 
health insurance than workers in the smallest firms that are not covered by a union. The 
corresponding effect in the largest firms is less at 158.1 %. 
Gender and race also have significantly larger effects in smaller firms. Female 
workers in the smallest firms receive a 50. 7% higher contribution to health insurance than 
males in the smallest firms. The corresponding effect in the largest firms is only 5.6%. Black 
workers in the smallest firms receive a 47.7% lower contribution than non-black workers in 
the smallest firms. The corresponding effect in the largest firms is only 32.9%. Workers from 
other minorities in the smallest firms receive a 46% lower contribution than workers not 
classified as other minorities. The corresponding effect in the largest firms is only 21.8%. 
Experience has a larger effect in the largest firms. In contrast, education has a 
smaller effect in the largest firms. At the sample mean, an employer's contribution to health 
insurance rises for workers in the smallest firms by 1.7% per year of experience and 27.7% 
per year of education. The corresponding effect for the largest firms is an increase of 4.3% 
per year of experience and 23.6% per added educational level. 
Marginal tax rates have larger effects in larger firms. The tax elasticity is 0.84 for 
workers in the largest firms and 0.31 for workers in the smallest firms. This implies a 10% 
increase in marginal tax rates in the largest firms will raise employer contributions to benefits 
by 8.4%. The corresponding effect is only 3.1 % in the smallest firms. A significant increase 
in the tax elasticity occurs when the firm reaches the second size group of 25 employees. 
In Figure 4.2, we show how the log of an employer's contribution to health insurance 
changes for workers in different firm sizes holding health insurance costs and tax rates fixed 
at their 1987 value. The sample means of all other variables are allowed to change each 
year. The gap is widest at the second size group of 26-99 employees. The simulation shows 
the log of employer contributions for this group would be 5.0 instead of 4.6 if prices and 
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taxes had remained at their 1987 levels. The log of employer contributions for the largest 
firms would be 5.7 instead of 5.6 if prices and taxes had remained at their 1987 levels. This 
implies that the changes in prices and taxes between 1987 and 2002 decreased employer 
contributions by 33% in firms with 26-99 employees and 9.5% in firms with more than 999 
employees. 
Hourly wages, by firm size. Employees in the smallest firms receive 22% lower 
hourly wages than employees in the largest firms, holding everything else constant. Table 
4.3 reports the estimates for five different firm sizes with the log of hourly wages as the 
dependent variable. All independent variables are significant at the .01 level. 
The effect of health insurance costs on wages increases until the firm reaches the 
fourth size group of 500-999 employees, and then reduces slightly. A 10% increase in health 
insurance costs causes a 1.1 % increase in wages for employees in the smallest firms and a 
1.7% increase for employees in the largest firms. In the third size group of employers, a 10% 
increase in health insurance costs causes a 2.1 % increase in wages. 
Marginal tax rates and measures of skill have significantly larger effects in larger 
firms. The tax elasticity is 0.18 for the smallest firms and 0.24 for the largest firms. This 
implies a 10% increase in marginal tax rates in the largest firms will raise wages by 2.4%. 
The corresponding effect is only 1 .8% in the smallest firms. At the sample mean, wages rise 
for large firm workers by 1.2% per year of experience and 10.2% per year of education. The 
corresponding effect for small firm workers is an increase of 0.5% per year of experience 
and 8. 7% per added educational level. 
Union coverage and metropolitan residence have larger effects in smaller firms. 
Workers in the smallest firms covered by a union receive 14.5% higher wages than workers 
in the smallest firms not covered by a union. The corresponding effect in the largest firms is 
only 11.4%. Workers in the smallest firms residing in metro areas receive 20.8% higher 
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wages than workers in the smallest firms residing in nonmetro areas. The corresponding 
effect in the largest firms is only 15.5%. 
In Figure 4.3, we show how the log of wages changes for workers in different firm 
sizes holding health insurance costs and tax rates fixed at their 1987 value. The sample 
means of all other variables are allowed to change each year. The simulation shows the log 
of wages for employees in the smallest firms would be 2.2 instead of 2.3 if prices and taxes 
had remained at their 1987 level. The log of wages for employees in the largest firms would 
be 2.5 instead of 2.7 if prices and taxes had remained at their 1987 level. This implies that 
the changes in prices and taxes between 1987 and 2002 increased wages by 10.5% for 
small firm workers and 22.1 % for large firm workers. 
Decomposition of Firm Size Gaps 
We estimate how much of the observed differences in health insurance coverage 
between small and large firms can be explained by our model using the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) adapted to the probit regression model. We 
provide a detailed discussion of this model in Chapter 3. 
The first column in Table 4.4 reports the results from this decomposition. Negative 
values mean the variable lowers the difference between small and large firms while positive 
numbers increase the difference. The total difference in firm-provided health insurance 
coverage is 43.8%. Overall, our model explains 7.0% of the difference in coverage, leaving 
36.8% unexplained. Lower education levels in small firms are responsible for the largest 
portion of the explained gap, or 70%. This is partially offset by higher experience in smaller 
firms, which serves to shrink the gap. The lower incidence of workers employed full -time in 
small firms account for 37.6% of the explained gap. Local labor market conditions, such as 
the unemployment rate and union coverage, account for another 10.5% of the explained gap 
in coverage. Even though the cost of health insurance and the marginal tax rate have 
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significant effects on the probability of health insurance coverage, they explain little of the 
gap in coverage between workers in small and large firms. Marginal tax rates do not vary 
greatly between metro and nonmetro areas, and so they cannot explain the gap. There is 
some variance in average health insurance costs across small and large firms, but the firm 
response to health insurance price is too inelastic for the cost difference to explain much of 
the gap in firm provision. 
Next, we estimate how much of the observed difference in the employer's 
contribution to health insurance between small and large firms can be explained by our 
model. Because our model is linear, we are able to use the original Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition. We provide a detailed discussion of this model in Chapter 3. 
The second column in Table 4.4 reports the results from this decomposition. 
Negative values mean the variable lowers the difference between small and large firms 
while positive numbers increase the difference. The total difference in the log of the 
employer's contribution to health insurance is 2.99. Overall, our model explains 0.54 of the 
difference in the employer's contribution, leaving 2.45 unexplained. In other words, our 
model explains 18% of the difference. Our results are very similar to the health insurance 
coverage decomposition. Lower education levels in small firms account for the largest 
portion of the explained gap, at 70%. This is partially offset by higher experience in smaller 
firms, which serves to shrink the gap. The lower incidence of workers employed full-time in 
small firms are responsible for 41.7% of the explained gap. The cost of health insurance and 
the marginal tax rate accounts for little of the gap in an employer's contributions to health 
insurance between small and large firms. 
Last, we estimate how much of the observed difference in wages between small and 
large firms can be explained by our model. Again, because our model is linear, we are able 
to use the original Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The third column in Table 4.4 reports the 
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results from this decomposition. Negative values mean the variable lowers the difference 
between small and large firms while positive numbers increase the difference. The total 
difference in the log of wages is 0.35. Overall, our model explains 0.11 of the difference in 
wages, leaving 0.24 unexplained. In other words, our model explains 31 % of the difference. 
In contrast to the benefit decompositions, personal characteristics substantially lower the 
gap in wages between small and large firms. Specifically, the lower incidence of female and 
black employees in smaller firms lowers the gap in wages. Similar to prior results, education 
still explains the largest portion of the explained wage gap. The lower incidence of workers 
employed full-time in small firms accounts for 41. 7% of the explained gap, a smaller fraction 
than found in the benefit decompositions. Also, insurance costs and marginal tax rates 
explain little of the difference in wages between small and large firms. 
Conclusions 
Our main objective was to determine the underlying reasons for the difference in 
health insurance coverage, health insurance quality, and wages between different firm 
sizes. We also investigated why these differences have changed over time. 
Employees in the smallest firms were 36.9% less likely to be covered by firm-
provided health insurance than employees in the largest firms, holding everything else 
constant. We found that health insurance costs and union coverage affected the probability 
of health insurance coverage more in smaller firms than in larger firms. Conversely, full-time 
status had a significantly larger effect in larger firms. Measures of skill and marginal income 
tax rates had close to the same effect across all firm sizes. 
The changes in prices and taxes between 1987 and 2002 lowered the probability of 
firm-provided health insurance coverage by 1.7% in the smallest firms and 3.0% in the 
largest firms. Our model explained around 16% of the difference in coverage between small 
and large firms. Lower education levels in small firms accounted for the largest portion of the 
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explained gap. Health insurance costs and marginal tax rates explained very little of the 
difference in coverage between small and large firms. This suggests that changes to 
insurance costs and marginal taxes alone will do little to improve the firm size gap in health 
insurance coverage. 
Employees in the smallest firms received 91.4% lower employer contributions to 
benefits than employees in the largest firms, holding everything else constant. We 
determined that health insurance costs, union coverage, gender, race, and experience 
affected the employer's contribution to health insurance more in small firms than in large 
firms. Conversely, experience and marginal tax rates had larger effects in large firms rather 
than small firms. 
The changes in prices and taxes between 1987 and 2002 lowered the real employer 
contribution to health insurance by 24.8% in the smallest firms and 9.5% in the largest firms. 
Our model explained around 18% of the difference in the log of an employer's contribution to 
health insurance. Similar to our results for the health insurance coverage decomposition, the 
lower education levels in small firms was responsible for the largest portion of the explained 
gap. Again, health insurance costs and marginal tax rates explained very little of the 
difference in an employer's contributions to health insurance between small and large firms. 
Workers in the smallest firms received 22% lower wages than workers in the largest 
firms, holding everything else constant. We concluded the effect of health insurance costs 
on wages increased until the firm reached the third size group of 100 employees, and then 
reduced slightly. We found that marginal tax rates and measures of skill had significantly 
larger effects in larger firms. Conversely, union coverage and metropolitan residence 
affected wages more in smaller firms than larger firms. 
The changes in prices and taxes between 1987 and 2002 increased real wages by 
10.5% in the smallest firms and 22.1 % in the largest firms. Our model explained close to 
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one-third of the difference in the log of wage. Again, lower education levels in small firms 
accounted for the largest portion of the explained gap. In contrast to the benefit 
decompositions, personal characteristics substantially lowered the gap in wages between 
small and large firms. Health insurance costs and marginal tax rates explained little of the 
difference in wages between small and large firms. 
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Tables & Figures 
Table 4.1: Probit Estimation of the Probability of Firm-Provided Health Insurance Coverage, 
b F s· 1y 1rm 1ze 
Variable BEN: <25 BEN: 26-99 BEN: 100-499 BEN: 500-999 BEN: >999 
employees employees employees employees employees 
In (PRICE) -0.031 -0.058 -0.022 -0.013 -0.005 
(159.25) (173.90) (71.47) (-27.81) (30.16) 
FT 0.291 0.425 0.462 0.412 0.407 
(2216.37) (1894.85) (2054.59) (1195 .02) (3143.32) 
FEMALE 0.065 0.032 0.047 0.038 0.023 
(624.52) (237.10) (397.68) (218.46) (333.62) 
BLACK -0.096 -0.114 -0.109 -0.076 -0.056 
(633.98) (617.58) (693.41) (335.52) (666.38) 
OTHMIN -0.088 -0.075 -0.079 -0.056 -0.048 
(358.53) (223.82) (266.85) (131.78) (285.82) 
WIDOW -0.008 0.009 0.007 0.002 -0.023 
(29.03) (27.66) (25.37) (5.76) (133.91) 
DIVOR 0.030 0.032 0.027 0.020 0.015 
(251.68) (208.28) (199.13) (95.31) (194.90) 
CHILD<18 -0.029 -0.022 -0.029 -0.024 -0.021 
(381.35) (243.64) (354.13) (198.39) (462.30) 
UNION 0.172 0.179 0.148 0.132 0.114 
(356.20) (430.22) (517.35) (322.13) (816.28) 
EXP 0.013 0.018 0.020 0.021 0.026 
(280.91) (290.36) (373.31) (255.33) (829.10) 
EDUC 0.078 0.075 0.081 0.054 0.086 
(542.06) (424.44) (507.32) (219.70) (803.16) 
TAX 0.183 0.330 0.306 0.434 0.357 
(107.33) (156.65) (163.74) (157.69) (333.58) 
EXPL -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(112.29) (-119.04) (185.23) (231.50) (569.78) 
EDU CL -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.001 
(213.01) (99.91) (203.85) (58.54) (569.78) 
EDUC x EXP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(296.52) (265.57) (340.05) (152.57) (641.75) 
In (STEARN) 0.247 0.235 0.156 0.084 0.119 
(483.67) (358.70) (274.86) (99 .39) (361.87) 
In (PLANO) 0.020 0.026 0.017 0.019 0.010 
(256 .56) (258.63) (181.11) (138.97) (361.87) 
URA TE -0.018 -0.012 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 
(474 .81) (258.35) (189.34) (145.50) (222.30) 
In (CPI) -0.276 -0.198 -0.172 -0.245 -0.245 
(294.59) (161.01) (155.16) (146.24) (375.10) 
METRO 0.063 0.061 0.014 0.017 0.057 
(465.54) (330.72} (89.54) (72.08) (547.89) 
Pred. P (at x-bar) a .350 .606 .711 .765 .788 
Obs. Probability .372 .601 .696 .747 .768 
Pseudo R.:'. 0.100 0.107 0.113 0.10 0.114 
Log likelihood -62458376 -40379957 -39903181 -14408953 -84906099 
Note: Frequency weighted regressions based on a sample of 249,821 single workers from 1987 to 2002. BEN is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is covered by firm-provided health insurance. z statistics in 
parenthesis . 
aPredicted probability at the mean value for each independent variable. 
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T bl 4 2 E . f h R IE a e .. st1mat1on o t e ea mp ayer C .b . f H Ith I ontn ut1on or ea b F' s· nsurance, 1y 1rm 1ze 
Variable In CON: In CON: In CON: 100- In CON: 500- In CON: >999 
<25 26-99 499 999 employees 
employees employees employees employees 
In (PRICE) -0.223 -0.367 -0.129 -0.068 -0.0003 
(169.80) (164.77) (62.67) (21.31) (0.27) 
FT 2.090 2.978 3.251 3.019 3.025 
(2277.61) (2067.30) (2325.67) (1383.80) (3722.25) 
FEMALE 0.410 0.127 0.208 0.170 0.055 
(570.73) (143.17) (261.54) (139.15) (116.67) 
BLACK -0.645 -0.794 -0.790 -0.587 -0.399 
(624.20) (649.56) (748.55) (373.80) (683.38) 
OTHMIN -0.616 -0.438 -0.430 -0.306 -0.246 
(358.76) (197.21) (218.02) (104.43) (213.06) 
WIDOW -0.041 0.138 0.152 0.088 -0.066 
(22.92) (61.11) (77.05) (29.22) (54.80) 
DIVOR 0.234 0.308 0.286 0.238 0.226 
(285.40) (296.76) (307.27) (165.64) (407.90) 
CHILD<18 -0.141 -0.063 -0.086 -0.038 -0.016 
(285.33) (103.40) (152.56) (42.99) (47.45) 
UNION 1.313 1.307 1.058 1.008 0.948 
(400.74) (471.07) (539.56) (346.76) (944.16) 
EXP 0.095 0.146 0.176 0.200 0.253 
(309.22) (370.30) (492.56) (355.16) (1129.43) 
EDUC 0.309 0.513 0.619 0.539 0.808 
(378.46) (483.64) (624.99) (311.89) (1093.28) 
TAX 1.468 2.922 2.825 3.926 3.857 
(126.01) (208.77) (223.12) (203.23) (511.35) 
EXPL -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
(176.88) (208.76) (306.90) (326.75) (850.61) 
EDU CL 0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.015 
(72.67) (115.29) (283.34) (137.58) (646.57) 
EDUC x EXP -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 
(291.27) (323.60) (437.30) (230.90) (878.75) 
In (STEARN) 2.079 2.282 1.933 1.562 1.727 
(595.39) (524.85) (502.07) (260.74) (7 49.21) 
In (PLANO) 0.162 0.219 0.172 0.206 0.125 
(304.58) (326.48) (278.83) (215.41) (337.83) 
URATE -0.104 -0.062 -0.033 -0.044 -0.006 
(413.38) (196.09) (115.06) (99.23) (32.41) 
In (CPI) -1.648 -1.166 -0.974 -1.602 -1.617 
(257.88) (142.62) (129.96) (136.34) (354.98) 
METRO 0.490 0.555 0.293 0.327 0.566 
(530.34) (142.62) (283.99) (192.87) (778.83) 
CONSTANT 0.306 -3.980 -5.993 -1.621 -4.533 
(12.58) (133.57) (219.95) (37.46) (267.81) 
Ro:'. 0.12 0.143 0.146 0.129 0.146 
Note: Frequency weighted regressions based on a sample of 249,821 single workers from 1987 to 
2002. In CON is the log of one plus the employer contribution to health insurance. t statistics in 
parenthesis. 
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T bl a e 4.3: E . f h W E b F s· st1mat1on o t e age .quat1on, 1y 1rm 1ze 
Variable In W: <25 In W: 26-99 In W: 100-499 In W: 500-999 In W: >999 
employees employees employees employees employees 
In (PRICE) 0.108 0.147 0.207 0.161 0.171 
(423.47) (371 .77) (557.69) (267.05) (729.42) 
FT 0.141 0.277 0.286 0.208 0.275 
(789.78) (1083.83) (1132.98) (506.84) (1814.94) 
FEMALE -0.149 -0.153 -0.142 -0.105 -0.130 
(1071.48) (969.71) (988.85) (456.47) (1483.98) 
BLACK -0.143 -0.148 -0.171 -0.153 -0.107 
(712.93) (683.65) (897.72) (518.23) (979.50) 
OTHMIN -0.072 -0.025 -0.028 -0.041 -0.009 
(215.06) (64.12) (79.94) (7 4.48) (40.23) 
WIDOW 0.035 0.043 0.086 0.041 -0.002 
(99.95) (107.47) (242.36) (71.64) (10.06) 
DIVOR 0.105 0.096 0.083 0.060 0.068 
(656.00) (520.17) (492.35) (223.66) (656.56) 
CHILD<18 -0.008 -0.014 -0.016 -0.027 -0.023 
(82.95) (125.36) (151.95) (161.15) (656.56) 
UNION 0.135 0.136 0.085 0.097 0.108 
(211.51) (275.72) (240.49) (177.45) (578.69) 
EXP 0.020 0.024 0.030 0.041 0.044 
(338.34) (344.23) (466.19) (389.63) (1045.55) 
EDUC 0.024 0.076 0.100 0.054 0.073 
(153.78) (403.64) (558.71) (165.85) (533.72) 
TAX 0.820 0.759 0.958 1.020 1.082 
(362.22) (305.83) (419.20) (280.48) (770.41) 
EXPL -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 
(358.04) (360.52) (506.37) (450.17) (1109.54) 
EDUC2 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
(567.30) (165.93) (101.31) (228.31) (389.19) 
EDUC x EXP -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(163.41) (132.16) (195.77) (157.78) (434.48) 
In (STEARN) 0.186 0.157 0.098 0.222 0.253 
(274.24) (203.37) (140.82) (196.41) (589.16) 
In (PLANO) 0.044 0.043 0.030 0.041 0.028 
(424.06) (361.60) (266.94) (228.56) (408.13) 
URATE -0.013 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 
(264.46) (126.92) (126.09) (55.43) (57.58) 
In (CPI) 0.730 0.578 0.469 0.422 0.261 
(587.75) (398.41) (346.74) (190.64) (307.37) 
METRO 0.189 0.176 0.133 0.130 0.144 
(1049.32) (819.37) (712.37) (406.19) (1068.19) 
Constant -4.730 -4.563 -4.452 -3.929 -3.349 
(999.61) (864.05) (905.28) (481.91) (1062.11) 
RL 0.196 0.238 0.272 0.247 0.258 
Note: Frequency weighted regressions based on a sample of 249,821 single workers from 
1987 to 2002. In W is the log of the hourly wage last year. t statistics in parenthesis. 
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T bl 4 4 Bl' d 0 a e .. 1n er- axaca D T W . ht d P ecompos1 ion: e1g e t ercen age o fE 1· dV ·r x::> a1ne ana1on 
BEN a In CON° In we 
In (PRICE) 0.0% 0.0% 1% 
FT 37.6% 41.7% 19% 
EXP -22.2% -25.0% -14% 
EDUC 70.2% 70.0% 97% 
METRO 5.3% 6.7% 9% 
TAX 1.0% 1.2% 2% 
Cost of living -0.2% 0.1% 0% 
Personal characteristics -2.2% -3.7% -19% 
Local labor market conditions 10.5% 9.0% 5% 
Sum 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: Author calculations based on a sample from the Current Population Survey of 249,821 
single workers from 1987 to 2002. Corrected for sample weights. 
aThe total difference in firm-provided health insurance coverage is 43.8%. 7.0% of this is 
explained, leaving 36.8% unexplained. 
bThe total difference in the log of the employer's contribution to health insurance is 2.99. 
0.54 of this is explained, leaving 2.45 unexplained. 
cThe total difference in the log of wages is 0.35. 0.11 of this is explained, leaving 0.24 
unexplained. 
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Chapter 5: General Conclusions 
This paper examines the factors influencing employer-provided health insurance 
benefits and wages. We use a previously unavailable price series to investigate the role of 
rising health insurance costs and changing marginal tax rates on compensation choices. We 
then extend our analysis to examine metro-nonmetro and firm size differences in health 
insurance benefits and wages. Specifically, we explore how the metro-nonmetro and firm 
size gaps have evolved over time and research the underlying factors explaining the divide. 
The majority of individuals in the U.S. are covered by health insurance through the 
workplace (EBRI, 2003). The cost of firm-provided health insurance net of inflation rose 
104% from 1987 to 2002. This trend should increase the likelihood that firms will reduce 
their contribution to health insurance benefits or drop them altogether. Over that same 
period, the average marginal tax rate in the U.S. remained relatively stable. However, 
significant variation occurred in a number of states. Higher tax rates should raise the cost of 
compensation in the form of wages relative to benefits because benefits typically are 
untaxed. Consistent with these two hypotheses, empirical results show that both insurance 
costs and taxes have a significant impact on health insurance benefits and wages. The 
combined effects of the changes in health insurance costs and taxes was a 4.6% reduction 
in the probability of firm-provided health insurance coverage, an 18.2% reduction in average 
employer contributions to health insurance, and a 17.9% increase in wages as employers 
shifted compensation from providing benefits to wages. 
Workers residing in metro areas had more generous compensation packages than 
workers residing in nonmetro areas. Metro residents were 5.3% more likely to be covered by 
firm-provided health insurance, received 61 % higher employer contributions to health 
insurance, and earned 17% higher wages than nonmetro residents, holding everything else 
constant. The lower education level of workers residing in nonmetro areas explains the 
95 
largest portion of the metro-nonmetro compensation gaps. The higher incidence of 
nonmetro residents employed by the smallest firms also explains a large portion of the 
difference. Although health insurance costs and taxes have significant effects on health 
insurance benefits, they explain little of the metro-nonmetro gaps. This suggests that 
changes to insurance costs and marginal taxes alone will do little to improve the regional 
gap in health insurance benefits. However, health insurance costs do explain a substantial 
portion of the difference in wages between metro and nonmetro residents. Rising health 
insurance costs actually widened the metro-nonmetro wage gap, as illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
The changes in prices between 1987 and 2002 increased real wages by 20.1 % in metro 
areas and only 4.3% in nonmetro areas. 
Small firm workers had less generous compensation packages than large firm 
workers. Employees in the smallest firms were 36.9% less likely to be covered by firm-
provided health insurance, received 91.4% lower employer contributions to health 
insurance, and earned 22% lower wages than employees in the largest firms, holding 
everything else constant. The lower education level of individuals working for small firms 
explains the largest portion of the firm size compensation gaps. Other variables explaining 
the firm size gap include the lower incidence of workers employed full-time in small firms 
and local labor market conditions. Health insurance costs and marginal tax rates explain 
very little of the difference in benefits and wages between small and large firms. 
Consequently, equalizing health insurance premiums will have very little impact on the 
proportion of workers covered by employer-provided health insurance in small firms, or the 
quality of health insurance offered. 
Similar to previous studies, we are only able to explain a portion of firm size 
compensation gaps (see Brown and Medoff, 1990; Oi and ldson, 1999; Troske, 1999). One 
possible area for further research is the impact of underwriting on small firm and nonmetro 
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health insurance provision and quality. This research would require an employer-employee 
matched data set. Since we did not have demographic data and health history on all 
employees in a given firm, we were unable to analyze the underwriting effect. However, 
smaller firms face underwriting similar to individuals, which typically makes their health 
insurance costs higher than larger firms. A related area for further research would be the 
effect of small group reform on firm-provided health insurance benefits. Assuming that the 
firm response to health insurance price is fairly inelastic, small group reform is unlikely to 
increase the provision of health insurance benefits for small firms. 
The CPS identifies whether or not an individual resides in a metro area. However, it 
does not specify the location of their employment. This may cause us to understate the 
differences in metro and nonmetro compensation, as some nonmetro workers may commute 
to metro areas for their job and vice-versa. Also, as shown by The Kaiser Commission and 
The Muskie School (2003}, there are wide gaps in health insurance coverage between 
nonmetro residents who lived in counties adjacent versus not adjacent to a metro county. 
An area for further research would be to analyze insurance costs and taxes within a dataset 
that identifies both the location of an individual's employment and distinguishes between 
different types of nonmetro areas. 
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Appendix: Selected Sample Statistics and Regression Results for 
Married and Single Workers 
Table A.1: Sample Statistics and Definitions, Married and S I W k inq e or ers 
Variable Mean Standard Description of Variable 
Deviation 
BEN 0.609 0.488 Dummy variable: Indicates employer 
provides health insurance contribution 
CON 1693.006 1798.970 Emolover health insurance contribution 
In CON 4.721 3.820 Log of one plus the employer health 
insurance contribution 
WAGE 15.131 14.596 Hourly waqe last year 
lnW 2.470 0.702 Loq of hourly waqe last year 
INSPRICE 3478.446 1379.523 Cost of insurance 
In (PRICE) 8.080 0.387 Loa of the cost of insurance 
FT 0.877 0.329 Dummy variable: Worked full-time at least 
part of the prior vear 
MICROER 0.229 0.420 Dummy variable: Employed by a firm with 
<25 employees 
SMER 0.142 0.349 Dummy variable: Employed by a firm with 
25-99 employees 
MEDER 0.162 0.368 Dummy variable: Employed by a firm with 
100-499 employees 
LGER 0.065 0.247 Dummy variable: Employed by a firm with 
500-999 employees 
IN STER 0.402 0.490 Dummy variable: Employed by a firm with 
1000+ employees 
FEMALE 0.469 0.499 Dummy variable: Female 
BLACK 0.112 0.315 Dummy variable: Black 
OTHMIN 0.041 0.199 Dummy variable: Other minority groups 
WIDOW 0.015 0.120 Dummy variable: Widowed 
DIVOR 0.120 0.325 Dummy variable: Divorced 
NEV MAR 0.182 0.386 Dummy variable: Never married 
SEP 0.028 0.166 Dummv variable: Separated 
CHILD<18 0.846 1.101 Number of children never married <18 in 
family 
UNION 0.039 0.194 Dummy variable: Member of a labor union 
or covered by a labor union 
EXP 20.721 9.965 Age-years of education-6 
EDUC 13.247 2.683 Index of education level (from 0: none to 
18: Master's degree or bevond) 
TAX 0.165 0.027 Average sum of state and federal marginal 
tax rate in the state 
In (STEARN) 2.513 0.165 Log of state average manufacturing 
earninas 
In (PLANO) 7.283 0.688 Loa of state averaqe farmland value 
URATE 5.533 1.474 State unemployment rate 
In (CPI) 5.395 0.121 Loa of the consumer price index 
METRO 0.815 0.388 Dummy variable: Metropolitan residence 
AGE 39.968 9.542 Age 
Number of Observations= 847,748 
Note: Author compilation of average values for married and single employees in the Current Population Survey, 
various years. Sample statistics are corrected for sample weights. 
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Table A.2: Probit Estimation of Firm-Provided Health Insurance Coverage and OLS 
Estimation of the Log of the Real Employer Contribution to Health Insurance, Married and 
s· I W k 1ng e or ers 
Variable BENa In CON° 
In (PRICE) -0.003 -0 .042 
(50.50) (93.72) 
FT 0.411 2.807 
(8935.96) (9831 .04) 
MICROER -0.367 -2.554 
(9853.66) (,) 
SMER -0.161 -1 .100 
(3706.75) (3943.41) 
MEDER -0.066 -0.450 
(1584.55) (1701 .43) 
LGER -0.019 -0.148 
(310.05) (391 .10) 
FEMALE -0.099 -0.812 
(3430.51) (4330.62) 
BLACK -0.076 -0.505 
(1658.24) (1719.65) 
OTHMIN -0.075 -0.451 
(1043.99) (990.49) 
WIDOW 0.068 0.250 
(593.92) (328.65) 
DIVOR 0.082 0.350 
(1870.13) (1204.79) 
NEV MAR 0.034 -0.055 
(801 .33) (201 .24) 
SEP 0.005 -0 .113 
(64.73) (205.94) 
CHILD<18 -0.010 -0.010 
(663.82) (101 .44) 
UNION 0.152 1.028 
(2042.41) (2213.91) 
EXP 0.018 0.136 
(1312.45) (1555.92) 
EDUC 0.087 0.576 
(2140.32) (2320.51) 
MTR BY ST 0.257 2.317 
(393.81) (550.96) 
EXP~ -0.00005 -0.001 
(286.43) (574.32) 
EDUC" -0.001 -0.009 
(1102.87) (1160.14) 
EDUC x EXP -0.001 -0.006 
(1480.18) (1589.39) 
In (STEARN) 0.168 1.690 
(1193.67) (1864.97) 
In (PLANO) 0.013 0.123 
(576.04) (831.96) 
URA TE -0.006 -0.021 
(594.95) (314.50) 
In (CPI) -0.314 -1.597 
(1160.38) (919.62 ) 
METRO 0.019 0.234 
(511.11) (956.83) 
Constant -0 .013 
(1 .98) 
Predicted Probability (at x-bar) a .618 
Observed Probability .609 
R" 0.17 e 0.22 
Log likelihood -7.929e+08 
Note: Frequency weighted regressions based on a sample of 847,748 workers from 1987 to 2002. 
aDummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is covered by firm-provided health insurance. z statistics in parenthesis. 
blog of one plus the employer contribution to health insurance. t statistics in parenthesis. 
clog of the hourly wage last year. t statistics in parenthesis 
ePredicted probability at the mean value for each independent variable. 
ePseudo-R-square 
In We 
0.126 
(1662.7) 
0.194 
(3948.96) 
-0.248 
(6010.98) 
-0 .143 
(2988.57) 
-0.091 
(2019.05) 
-0.054 
(832.44) 
-0.273 
(8496.4) 
-0.144 
(2864.08) 
-0.091 
(1160.75) 
-0.117 
(899.75) 
-0.077 
(1556.93) 
-0.164 
(3473.09) 
-0.136 
(1446.81) 
0.006 
(355.79) 
0.078 
(980.9) 
0.037 
(2453.46) 
0.056 
(1323.89) 
1.209 
(1677.15) 
-0.0004 
(2292.04) 
0.002 
(1801 .19) 
-0.001 
(1189.46) 
0.242 
(1557.32) 
0.038 
(1492.32) 
-0.004 
(357.23) 
0.488 
(1639.02) 
0.152 
(3621 .82) 
-3.748 
(3372.33) 
0.32 
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Endnotes 
Firms, particularly partnerships or sole proprietorships, may maximize utility rather 
than profit. However, profit would be an element in the owner's utility function. Under the 
assumption that profits are separable from other elements of the owner's utility function, the 
first order conditions are unchanged. If profits are not separable, then the models 
conclusions may not apply in the case of partnerships or sole proprietorships. 
2 Even in the case of collective bargaining, firms negotiate compensation terms with 
the right to make "take it or leave it" offers if there is an impasse. 
3 According to the EBRI Health Confidence Survey (EBRI & Mathew Greenwald & 
Associates, 2004), 79% of employees say benefits are very important when choosing a job 
and rank health insurance as the most important benefit. Furthermore, 3 in 4 employees 
would prefer receiving health insurance benefits rather than the money employers spend on 
insurance. 
4 The low insurance coverage for employees in the smallest firm could reflect the 
higher cost of health insurance to providers and/or lower benefits demand by small firms. 
5 The probability of benefits and employer contribution to benefits is higher for single 
females. This effect appears to be related to the types of occupations that single females 
are in. Also, it may be the single women value benefits more than single men. As shown in 
the Appendix, women are less likely to get benefits than men if we look at all workers. 
103 
Acknowledgements 
I would first like to thank my fiance, Sterley "Brett" Phelps, for his support and 
encouragement while I balanced both graduate school and working full-time. I'd also like to 
thank my father, Keith Stende, both for his helpful suggestions on this study and the 
guidance he's provided throughout my education. 
I am grateful to a number of individuals for their assistance with this study. First and 
foremost, I would like to thank my major professor, Peter F. Orazem. Dr. Orazem provided 
invaluable assistance in designing and conducting this study and went out of his way to 
accommodate my challenging schedule. He also took the time to teach me a number of 
econometric techniques as a part of the research process. Second, I'd like to extend my 
appreciation to my committee members, Helen J. Jensen and Mark L. Power, for their 
careful review and helpful comments. Finally, I'd like to thank two reviewers at The Principal 
Financial Group, Russell Lemken and Roger Brown, for providing insight from the 
perspective of the financial services industry. 
I would like to express my appreciation to my employer, The Principal Financial 
Group, for their scheduling flexibility, tuition reimbursement, and access to research data. In 
particular, I would like to thank Roger Brown and Sandra Grant for their encouragement and 
accommodation throughout graduate school. 
